Note: Intro -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Plates -- Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1: Perceptions, Sensations and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Singer -- 1.1 Visual Illusions and their Interpretation by Cognitive Scientists -- 1.1.1 Misdescription of visual illusions by cognitive scientists -- 1.2 Gestalt Laws of Vision -- 1.3 Split-Brain Commissurotomy -- the Two Hemispheres may Operate Independently -- 1.3.1 Misdescription of the results of commissurotomy -- 1.3.2 Explaining the discoveries derived from commissurotomies -- 1.4 Specificity of Cortical Neurons -- 1.4.1 Cardinal cells -- 1.4.2 Misdescription of experiments leading to the conception of cardinal cells -- 1.5 Multiple Pathways Connecting Visual Cortical Modules -- 1.6 Mental Images and Representations -- 1.6.1 Misconceptions about images and representations -- 1.7 What and Where Pathways in Object Recognition and Maps -- 1.8 Misuse of the Term 'Maps' -- 1.9 The Binding Problem and 40 Hz Oscillations -- 1.9.1 Misconceptions concerning the existence of a binding problem -- 1.9.2 On the appropriate interpretation of synchronicity of neuronal firing in visual cortex -- 1.10 Images and Imagining -- 1.10.1 Misconceptions concerning images and imagining -- 2: Attention, Awareness and Cortical Function: Helmholtz to Raichle -- 2.1 The Concept of Attention -- 2.2 The Psychophysics of Attention -- 2.3 Neuroscience of Attention -- 2.3.1 Attention and arousal -- 2.3.2 Selective attention -- 2.4 Attention Related to Brain Structures -- 2.4.1 Superior colliculus -- 2.4.2 Parietal cortex -- 2.4.3 Visual cortex -- 2.4.4 Auditory cortex -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3: Memory and Cortical Function: Milner to Kandel -- 3.1 Memory -- 3.1.1 The hippocampus is required for memory, which decays at two different rates. , 3.1.2 Memory is of two kinds: declarative and non-declarative -- 3.1.3 Cellular and molecular studies of non-declarative memory in invertebrates -- 3.1.4 Declarative memory and the hippocampus -- 3.1.5 Long-term potentiation (LTP) of synaptic transmission in the hippocampus -- 3.1.6 Cellular and molecular mechanisms of declarative memory in the hippocampus -- 3.1.7 Summary -- 3.2 Memory and Knowledge -- 3.2.1 Memory -- 3.2.2 Memory and storage -- 3.3 The Contribution of Neuroscience to Understanding Memory -- 4: Language and Cortical Function: Wernicke to Levelt -- 4.1 Introduction: Psycholinguistics and the Neuroanatomy of Language -- 4.2 The Theory of Wernicke/Lichtheim -- 4.2.1 Introduction: Wernicke -- 4.2.1.1 Images of sensations -- 4.2.1.2 Movement images -- 4.2.1.3 Voluntary movement -- 4.2.1.4 Sound images and language -- 4.2.1.5 Language acquisition, words and concepts -- 4.2.2 Lichtheim's concept centre -- 4.2.3 Concepts and representations -- 4.2.4 Conclusion -- 4.3 The Mental Dictionary and its Units: Treisman -- 4.4 The Modular Study of Word Recognition and Reading Aloud: Morton -- 4.4.1 The model system -- 4.4.2 The cognitive system -- 4.4.3 Thought units -- 4.4.4 Computational studies -- 4.5 The Modular Study of Fluent Speech: Levelt -- 4.5.1 The model study -- 4.5.2 Development of the model system -- 4.6 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Language Comprehension -- 4.6.1 Attention to visual compared with semantic aspects of words -- 4.6.2 Auditory compared with visual presentation of words -- 4.6.3 Attention to the semantic as compared to the syntatic aspect of a sentence -- 4.7 The Functional Neuroanatomy of Speech -- 4.7.1 Speech -- 4.7.2 Spoken action words and colour words -- 4.7.3 Naming animals and tools -- 4.7.4 Speaking with strings of words compared with single words -- 4.7.5 Word repetition. , 4.8 The Functional Neuroanatomy that Underpins Psycholinguistic Accounts of Language -- 5: Emotion and Cortical-Subcortical Function: Darwin to Damasio -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Darwin -- 5.3 Cognitive versus Precognitive Theories for the Expression of Emotions -- 5.3.1 On physiological measurements of emotional responses -- 5.3.2 Involvement of the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex in the emotional responses to faces -- 5.4 The Amygdala -- 5.4.1 Faces expressing different emotions and the amygdala: PET and fMRI -- 5.4.2 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the amygdala -- 5.4.3 Fear conditioning and the amygdala -- 5.4.4 Is cognitive appraisal an important ingredient in emotional experience? LeDoux's interpretations of his experiments on the -- 5.4.5 'Fear' is unrepresentative of the emotions -- 5.5 The Orbitofrontal Cortex -- 5.5.1 Behavioural studies involving face recognition following damage to the orbitofrontal cortex -- 5.5.2 The orbitofrontal cortex and face recognition: PET and fMRI -- 5.5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex and the satisfying of appetites: Rolls's interpretation of his experiments on the orbitofrontal c -- 5.5.4 Misconceptions about emotions and appetites -- 5.6 Neural Networks: Amygdala and Orbitofrontal Cortex in Vision -- 5.6.1 Amygdala -- 5.6.2 Orbitofrontal cortex -- 5.7 The Origins of Emotional Experience -- 5.7.1 The claims of LeDoux -- 5.7.2 The claims of Rolls -- 5.7.3 The claims of Damasio, following James -- 5.7.4 Misconceptions concerning the somatic marker hypothesis of James/Damasio -- 6: Motor Action and Cortical-Spinal Cord Function: Galen to Broca and Sherrington -- 6.1 The Ventricular Doctrine, from Galen to Descartes -- 6.1.1 Galen: motor and sensory centres -- 6.1.2 Galen: the functional localization of the rational soul in the anterior ventricles. , 6.1.3 Nemesius: the attribution of all mental functions to the ventricles -- 6.1.4 One thousand years of the ventricular doctrine -- 6.1.5 Fernel: the origins of neurophysiology -- 6.1.6 Descartes -- 6.2 The Cortical Doctrine: from Willis to du Petit -- 6.2.1 Thomas Willis: the origins of psychological functions in the cortex -- 6.2.2 The cortex 100 years after Willis -- 6.3 The Spinal Soul, the Spinal Sensorium Commune, and the Idea of a Reflex -- 6.3.1 The spinal cord can operate independently of the enkephalon -- 6.3.2 Bell and Magendie: the identifi cation of sensory and motor spinal nerves -- 6.3.3 Marshall Hall: isolating sensation from sense-reaction in the spinal cord -- 6.3.4 Elaboration of the conception of the 'true spinal marrow' -- 6.3.5 Implications of the conception of a refl ex for the function of the cortex -- 6.4 The Localization of Function in the Cortex -- 6.4.1 Broca: the cortical area for language -- 6.4.2 Fritsch and Hitzig: the motor cortex -- 6.4.3 Electrical phenomena in the cortex support the idea of a motor cortex -- 6.5 Charles Scott Sherrington: the Integrative Action of Synapses in the Spinal Cord and Cortex -- 6.5.1 Integrative action in the spinal cord -- 6.5.2 The motor cortex -- 7: Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive Neuroscience -- 7.1 Conceptual Elucidation -- 7.2 Two Paradigms: Aristotle and Descartes -- 7.3 Aristotle's Principle and the Mereological Fallacy -- 7.4 Is the Mereological Fallacy Really Mereological? -- 7.5 The Rationale of the Mereological Principle -- 7.5.1 Consciousness -- 7.5.2 Knowledge -- 7.5.3 Perception -- 7.6 The Location of Psychological Attributes -- 7.7 Linguistic Anthropology, Auto-anthropology, Metaphor and Extending Usage -- 7.8 Qualia -- 7.9 Enskulled Brains -- 7.10 Cognitive Neuroscience -- References -- Index -- Supplemental Images.

Note: Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Prolegomenon -- 1. Philosophical anthropology and the investigation of value -- 2. The sinopia for a fresco -- Acknowledgements -- Part I Of Good and Evil -- Chapter 1 The Roots of Value and the Nature of Morality -- 1. The place of values in a world of facts -- 2. Varieties of goodness -- 3. The framework of moral goodness -- 4. Morality -- 5. Individual critical morality -- Chapter 2 The Roots of Morality and the Nature of Moral Goodness -- 1. Moral goodness -- 2. The roots of moral value -- 3. Respect -- 4. The relative permanence of the virtues -- 5. Constants in human nature -- Chapter 3 The Roots of Evil -- 1. The horror! -- 2. The grammar of evil: preliminary clarification -- 3. Philosophical problems: does evil exist? -- 4. Philosophical problems: can evil be explained? -- Chapter 4 Explanations of Evil -- 1. The variety of explanations -- 2. Reasons and motives for doing evil -- 3. Can evil be a motive? -- 4. Knowledge of good and evil -- 5. Experimental psychology: Milgram's and Browning's explanations of evil‐doing -- Chapter 5 Evil and the Death of the Soul -- 1. Body, mind, and soul -- 2. The death of the soul -- 3. Forgiveness and self‐forgiveness -- 4. Evil and the unforgivable -- 5. From soul to soul: trisecting an angle with compass and rule -- Part II Of Freedom and Responsibility -- Chapter 6 Fatalism and Determinism -- 1. Of fate and fortune -- 2. Fatalism -- 3. Nomological determinism -- 4. Flaws in reductive determinism -- 5. The random and the determined -- Chapter 7 Neuroscientific Determinism, Freedom, and Responsibility -- 1. Neuroscientific determinism -- 2. Explanations of human behaviour: a recapitulation -- 3. Neuroscientific explanation and its limits -- 4. How possible, not why necessary -- 5. Varieties of responsibility -- 6. Elaboration. , 7. Irresistible impulse and temptation -- Part III Of Pleasure and Happiness -- Chapter 8 Pleasure and Enjoyment -- 1. Varieties of hedonism -- 2. Pleasure, enjoyment, and being pleased -- 3. Pleasure, pain, and the pleasures of sensation -- 4. Enjoyment and the pleasures of activities -- 5. Pleasure, desire, and satisfaction -- 6. Comparability and quantification -- 7. First-person judgements of pleasure -- 8. The hedonic life -- Chapter 9 Happiness -- 1. The linguistic terrain -- 2. A distinct idea of happiness -- 3. A clear idea of happiness -- 4. Preconditions of happiness -- 5. The epistemology of happiness -- 6. Two philosophical traditions -- 7. Happiness and morality -- Chapter 10 The Science of Happiness -- 1. From eighteenth-century crudity and back again -- 2. How happiness is understood by happiness scientists -- 3. Psychological and epistemological presuppositions of the science of happiness -- 4. Measuring happiness -- 5. Some results of the science of happiness -- Part IV Of Meaning and Death -- Chapter 11 The Need for Meaning -- 1. Meaning -- 2. The primacy of loss of meaning and the sense of meaninglessness -- 3. The roots of meaninglessness -- 4. Does life have a meaning? -- 5. Finding meaning in human life -- Chapter 12 The Place of Deathin Human Life -- 1. What is death? -- 2. An afterlife -- 3. The valuelessness of life -- 4. The value of life -- 5. Living for ever -- 6. Thanatophobia - the fear of death -- Appendix 1: On Animal Beliefs and Animal Morality -- 1. Animal morality -- 2. Animal thinking, animal thoughts, and animal memory -- 3. Counter-arguments and their rebuttal -- 4. Animal knowledge of other animals' minds -- 5. Animal emotions -- Appendix 2: Diabology: Satan, Lucifer, and the Devil in Western Thought -- Appendix 3: Hannah Arendt and the Banality of Evil. , Appendix 4: The Pictorial Representation of Pleasure in Western Art -- Index -- EULA.

Note: Intro -- Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience -- Contents -- Foreword to the Second Edition by Denis Noble -- Foreword to the First Edition by Denis Noble -- Acknowledgements to the Second Edition -- Acknowledgements to the First Edition -- Introduction to the First Edition -- Introduction to the Second Edition -- Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots -- Preliminaries to Part I -- 1 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots -- 2 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots -- 1 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System -- 1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine -- 1.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine -- 1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath -- 1.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall -- 1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig -- 1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington -- 1.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on the functioning of cortex: localization determined non-invasively by Ogawa and Sokolof -- 1.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers -- 2 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and His Protégés -- 2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact -- 2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism -- 2.3 John Eccles and the 'Liaison Brain' -- 2.4 Wilder Penfield and the 'Highest Brain Mechanism' -- 3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience -- 3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience -- 3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes -- 3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience. , 3.4 Replies to Objections -- 4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity -- 4.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being -- 4.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity -- 4.3 The Inner -- 4.4 Introspection -- 4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect -- 4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity -- 4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates: How They Are Explained and Learned -- 4.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature -- Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis -- Preliminaries to Part II -- 1 Brain-Body Dualism -- 2 The Project -- 3 The Category of the Psychological -- 5 Sensation and Perception -- 5.1 Sensation -- 5.2 Perception -- 5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities -- 5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz -- 5.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem -- 5.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr's theory of vision -- 6 The Cognitive Powers -- 6.1 Knowledge and Its Kinship with Ability -- 6.1.1 Ability and know-how -- 6.1.2 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge -- 6.2 Memory -- 6.2.1 Declarative and non-declarative memory -- 6.2.2 Storage, retention and memory traces -- 7 The Cogitative Powers -- 7.1 Belief -- 7.2 Thinking -- 7.3 Imagination and Mental Images -- 7.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery -- 8 Emotion -- 8.1 Affections -- 8.2 The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey -- 8.2.1 Neuroscientists' confusions -- 8.2.2 Analysis of the emotions -- 9 Volition and Voluntary Movement -- 9.1 Volition -- 9.2 Libet' s Theory of Voluntary Movement and Its Progeny -- 9.3 Refutations and Clarifications -- 9.4 Conflict-Monitoring and the Executive. , 9.5 Man and Machine: Doing Something Like an Automaton, Automatically, Mechanically, from Force of Habit -- 9.6 Taking Stock -- Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis -- 10 Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness -- 10.1 Consciousness and the Brain -- 10.2 Intransitive Consciousness and Awareness -- 10.2.1 Minimal states of consciousness or responsiveness -- 10.3 Transitive Consciousness and Its Forms -- 10.3.1 A partial analysis -- 11 Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia, Neural Correlates of Consciousness -- 11.1 Extending the Concept of Consciousness -- 11.2 Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States -- 11.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain -- 11.3 Qualia -- 11.3.1 'How it feels' to have an experience -- 11.3.2 Of there being something which it is like … -- 11.3.3 The qualitative character of experience -- 11.3.4 Thises and thuses -- 11.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia -- 12 Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory -- 12.1 The Integrated Information Theory of Tononi -- 12.1.1 Axiomatizing Integrated Information Theory -- 12.1.2 The ambiguity of 'information' -- 12.1.3 Unclarities about experience again -- 12.2 Global Workspace Theory -- 12.2.1 Analysis of Dehaene' s example -- 12.2.2 On Dehaene' s misconceptions of consciousness and information processing -- 12.3 On Finding One' s Way through a Conceptual Jungle with Worthless Tools -- 12.4 What Is Necessary for Neural Correlation -- 12.5 Where to Find the Explanations -- 13 Puzzles about Consciousness -- 13.1 A Budget of Puzzles -- 13.2 On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with Our Conception of an Objective Reality -- 13.3 On the Question of How Physical Processes Can Give Rise to Conscious Experience. , 13.4 Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness -- 13.5 The Problem of Awareness -- 13.6 Other Minds and Other Animals -- 14 Self-Consciousness and Selves, Thought and Language -- 14.1 Self-Consciousness and the Self -- 14.2 Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James -- 14.3 Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness -- 14.4 The Illusion of a 'Self ' -- 14.5 The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection -- 14.5.1 Thought and language -- 14.6 Self-Consciousness -- 15 Concepts, Thinking and Speaking -- 15.1 Concepts and Concept Possession -- 15.1.1 Beginning again -- 15.2 Concept Possession as Mastery of the Use of an Expression -- 15.3 What Do We Think In? -- Part IV On Method -- 16 Reductionism -- 16.1 Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism -- 16.2 Reduction by Elimination -- 16.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? -- 16.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? -- 16.2.3 Eliminating all that is human -- 16.2.4 Sawing off the branch on which one sits -- 17 Methodological Reflections -- 17.1 Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation -- 17.2 The 'Poverty of English' Argument -- 17.3 From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy -- 17.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation -- 17.4 Philosophy and Neuroscience -- 17.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do -- 17.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do -- 17.5 Why It Matters -- Appendices -- Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett -- 1 Dennett' s Methodology and Presuppositions -- 2 The Intentional Stance -- 3 Heterophenomenological Method -- 4 Consciousness -- Appendix 2 John Searle -- 1 Philosophy and Science -- 2 Searle' s Philosophy of Mind -- 3 Unified Field Theory -- 4 The Traditional Mind-Body Problem. , Appendix 3 Further Replies to Critics -- 1 The Mereological Principle -- 2 Essentialism -- 3 A Priorism: Empirical Learning Theory or the Nature of Primitive Language-Games -- 4 Criteria and Constitutive Evidence -- 5 Foundationalism, Linguistic Conservatism, Conceptual Change, Connective Analysis, Tolerating Inconsistencies and Post-Modernism -- Afterword to the Second Edition by Anthony Kenny -- Index -- EULA.