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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games (1998)
    Springer
    Journal of optimization theory and applications 98 (1998), S. 109-129 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-2878
    Keywords: Noncooperative games ; consistency ; Nash equilibrium refinements ; extensive form games
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract Strong and limit consistency in finite noncooperative games are studied. A solution is called strongly consistent if it is both consistent and conversely consistent (Ref. 1). We provide sufficient conditions on one-person behavior such that a strongly consistent solution is nonempty. We introduce limit consistency for normal form games and extensive form games. Roughly, this means that the solution can be approximated by strongly consistent solutions. We then show that the perfect and proper equilibrium correspondences in normal form games, as well as the weakly perfect and sequential equilibrium correspondences for extensive form games, are limit consistent.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1022688931144
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nash refinement of equilibria (1994)
    Springer
    Journal of optimization theory and applications 83 (1994), S. 355-373 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-2878
    Keywords: Noncooperative games ; Nash equilibrium ; Nash bargaining solution ; refinements
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract A method for choosing equilibria in strategic form games is proposed and axiomatically characterized. The method as well as the axioms are inspired by the Nash bargaining theory. The method can be applied to existing refinements of Nash equilibrium (e.g., perfect equilibrium) and also to other equilibrium concepts, like correlated equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02190062
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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