Note: Intro -- Probabilities, Laws,and Structures -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Team A: Formal Methods -- Chapter 1: Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities -- 1.1 For and Against Imprecise Probabilities -- 1.2 The Dutch Book Argument -- 1.2.1 Formalising Degrees of Belief -- 1.2.2 Bets and Betting -- 1.2.3 Constraints on Rational Betting Preference -- 1.3 Ambiguity and Complementarity -- 1.4 Decision with Imprecision -- Appendix: Proof -- References -- Chapter 2: Objectifying Subjective Probabilities: Dutch Book Arguments for Principles of Direct Inference -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Finite Case -- 2.3 The Infinite Case -- 2.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: The Foundations of Statistics: Inference vs. Decision -- 3.1 Why I am a Bayesian -- 3.2 Behavioralism -- 3.3 Fisher's Defense of Statistic al Inf erenc e -- 3.4 Cognitive Decision Theory and Truthlikeness -- 3.5 Bayesian Estimation -- 3.6 Discussion -- References -- Chapter 4: On the Verisimilitude of Tendency Hypotheses -- 4.1 Feature contrast (FC-) measures of similarity for binaryand quantitative features -- 4.2 FC-measures of verisimilitude for universaland statistical hypotheses -- 4.3 FC-measures of verisimilitude for T-hypotheses -- 4.4 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 5: Tweety, or Why Probabilism and even Bayesianism NeedObjective and Evidential Probabilities -- Abstract -- 5.1 Tweety and Nixon: Conditional Reasoning with Exceptionswithin the Framework of Probabilism -- 5.2 Tweety and Nixon are Incoherent in theBayesian Reconstruction -- 5.3 Objective Likelihoods and Bayesian Updating: FurtherReasons Why Bayesianism Needs Objective andSubjective-Evidential Probabilities -- 5.4 Do Humans Reason with One Or Two Probabilityfunctions? Tweety and Nixon Examples Put to Empirical Test -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References. , Chapter 6: Pluralism in Probabilistic Justification -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Infinite, Uniform Chains -- 6.3 Infinite, Uniform Networks -- 6.4 Contrasting Chains and Networks -- 6.5 Relevance and Applications -- Appendix -- Chapter 7: One Size Does Not Fit All: Proposal for a Prior-Adapted Bic -- 7.1 Overview -- 7.2 Introduction to the BIC -- 7.2.1 BIC as Approximate Marginal Likelihood -- 7.2.2 The Likelihoodist Information Criterion? -- 7.3 Comparing Models with Truncated Priors -- 7.3.1 Truncated Priors -- 7.3.2 Peaked Likelihoods and Concentrated Posteriors -- 7.3.3 BIC for Truncated Priors -- 7.4 Prior-Adapted BIC -- 7.4.1 Original Derivation -- 7.4.2 Including the Prior in the BIC -- 7.4.3 More Details on the Error Terms -- 7.5 The Role of the Prior -- 7.6 Application to the Conjunction Fallacy -- 7.7 Conclusion -- References -- Team B: Philosophy of the Natural and Life Sciences -- Team D: Philosophy of the Physical Sciences -- Chapter 8: Mathematical Biology and the Existence of Biological Laws -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Laws of Coexistence in Biology -- 8.3 Some Examples of Mathematical Models in Biology -- 8.4 Flocks of Starlings and Their Scale Invariant andTopologically-Dependent Interactions -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 8.5.1 Population biology and ecology -- 8.5.2 Phylogenetics and graph theory -- Chapter 9: On Empirical Generalisations -- Abstract -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Manipulationist Empirical Generalisations -- 9.3 The Dilemma -- 9.3.1 Horn 1: Conceptual Manipulationism -- 9.3.2 Horn 2: Methodological Manipulationism -- 9.3.2.1 Horn (a): The Strict Interpretation -- 9.3.2.2 Horn (b): The Charitable Interpretation -- 9.4 Empirical Generalisations Reassessed -- 9.4.1 Causal Modelling -- 9.4.2 Variational Epistemology -- 9.4.3 Invariance -- 9.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 10: The Limits of Interventionism - Causality in theSocial Sciences. , Abstract -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 ADilemm a for Interventionism -- 10.3 Some Remarks on the Dilemma -- 10.4 The Causal Model -- 10.5 'Intervening' in the Causal Model -- 10.6 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 11: Causal Realism -- Abstract -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Metaphysical Argument for Causal Properties -- 11.3 Structures and Causal Properties in Fundamental Physics -- 11.4 Causal Realism at Work in the Interpretationof Fundamental Physics -- 11.5 Causal Realism from Fundamental Physics to the SpecialSciences -- Chapter 12: Structural Invariants, Structural Kinds,Structural Laws -- 12.1 Structural Realism and Intrinsic ality: OSR Extended -- 12.2 Humean Structural Realism:Structural Kinds and Structural Laws -- 12.3 Humean Structural Realism: Categorical Structures -- 12.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 13: Santa's Gift of Structural Realism -- 13.1 -- 13.2 -- Chapter 14: The Resilience of Laws and the Ephemerality of Objects:Can A Form of Structuralism be Extended to Biology? -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Laws and the Lack Thereof -- 14.3 The Fluidity and Heterogeneity of Biological Objects -- 14.4 Causation in biology -- 14.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 15: Natural Kinds, Conceptual Change, and the Duck -BillPlatypus: LaPorte on Incommensurability -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 LaPorte on Meaning-Change, Inc omm ensurability,and the Rigidity of Kind Terms -- 15.3 Why LaPorte's View Does Not Cut Any Ice AgainstKuhn's Incomm ensurability. Part I: Precisification Versus Conceptual Change -- 15.4 Why LaPorte's View Does Not Cut Any Ice Against Kuhn'sInc omm ensurability. Part II: Precisification And Translatability -- 15.5 The Story of the Duck -Bill Platypus.Or, Against Precisification -- 15.6 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 16: Essentialism About Kinds: An Undead Issue in thePhilosophies of Physics and Biology? -- Abstract. , 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 What Work Could Kind Essentialism Do? -- 16.3 Kinds of Kind Essentialism -- 16.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 17: Biological Laws and Kinds Within a Conservative Reductionist Framework -- Abstract -- 17.1 Biological Laws -- 17.2 Conservative Reductionism -- 17.3 Perspectives -- Chapter 18: Why It Is Time to Move Beyond Nagelian Reduction -- 18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 The Dominance of the Nagelian Model - A Brief History -- 18.3 The Inadequacy of the Nagelian Acc ount -- 18.3.1 How to Develop an Account of Epistemic Reduction -- 18.3.2 Theories as Relata of Reduction -- 18.3.3 The Focus on Formal Issues -- 18.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 19: Probability, Indeterminism and Biological Processes -- 19.1 Introduction -- 19.2 Realism, Indeterminism and Omniscient Beings -- 19.3 Interpretations of Ontic Probabilities in EvolutionaryTheory -- 19.3.1 Propensity Interpretation -- 19.3.2 Frequency Interpretation -- 19.3.3 Humean Chances -- 19.4 Criticism of Sansom's Claim That Biological ProcessesAre Indeterministic -- 19.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 20: Bayesianism, Convergence and Molecular Phylogenetics -- Abstract -- 20.1 Introduction -- 20.2 The Bayesian Approach to Phylogenetic Inference -- 20.3 Convergence and Phylogenetic Inference -- 20.3.1 Savage's Convergence Theorem -- 20.3.2 Gaifman and Snir's Convergence Theorem -- 20.4 Conclusion -- Team C: Philosophy of the Cultural andSocial Sciences -- Chapter 21: Quantities as Realistic Idealizations -- 21.1 The Quantitative Method -- 21.2 Mathematics -- 21.3 Measurement -- 21.4 Realism and Idealizations -- 21.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 22: Mathematics as Quasi-matter to Build Models as Instruments -- 22.1 Introduction -- 22.2 Lost Materiality -- 22.3 Rigor -- 22.4 The Making of an Instrument -- 22.5 Mathematics as Quasi-Matter -- 22.6 Two Illustrative Cases -- 22.6.1 Cycle Model or Not?. , 22.6.2 Spurious Result or Not? -- 22.7 Conclusion -- Chapter 23: Mathematical Models and Economic Forecasting: Some Uses and Mis-Uses of Mathematics in Economics -- 23.1 Introduction -- 23.2 Formalizing Forecasting Theory -- 23.2.1 Stationary Scalar Example -- 23.2.2 Forecast-Error Taxonomy -- 23.2.3 Empirically-Relevant Theory -- 23.2.4 Designing Monte Carlo Simulations -- 23.3 Selecting Econometric Models from a Mass of Candidate Variables -- 23.3.1 As Many Candidate Variables as Observations -- 23.3.2 More Candidate Variables Than Observations -- 23.4 Models of Expectations -- 23.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 24: Technomathematical Models in the Social Sciences -- 24.1 Sciences and Technosciences -- 24.2 The Emergence of Technomathematics -- 24.3 Mathematical Models and Technomodels -- References -- Chapter 25: The Use of Mathematics in Physics and Economics:A Comparison -- 25.1 The Use of Mathematics in Physics -- 25.2 A Complication Caused by the Many DifferentSchools of Economics -- 25.3 The Use of Mathematics in Mainstream(Neoclassical) Economics -- Chapter 26: Mathematics in Cognitive Science -- Abstract -- 26.1 Clearing the Ground: Mathematics, Models,and Cognitive Science -- 26.2 From Prehistorical to Postmodern Cognitive Science:Five Stages -- 26.3 Mathematics as a Local Player: A Sample -- 26.4 Deep vs. Shallow Engagement -- 26.5 Strong Programs, Conceptual Reform and the Co-evolutionof Cognitive Science and Mathematics vs. Pluralismand the Toolbox Philosophy -- Chapter 27: What Can the Social Sciences Learn from the Processof Mathematization in the Natural Sciences -- Abstract -- 27.1 Introduction -- 27.2 Classification of Scientific Disciplines Acc ording to TheirRelation to the Paradigm -- 27.3 An Outline of a Reconstruction of the Scientific Revolution -- 27.4 The Revolution in Biology -- 27.4.1 The Mixed Disciplines of Modern Science. , 27.4.2 The Metaphorical Region of Modern Science.