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  • Cambridge University Press (CUP)  (8)
  • Economics  (8)
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  • Cambridge University Press (CUP)  (8)
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  • Economics  (8)
  • Law  (7)
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2014
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 10, No. 3 ( 2014-09), p. 399-426
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 10, No. 3 ( 2014-09), p. 399-426
    Abstract: This paper adds to the growing empirical evidence on the importance of habits in governing human behavior, and sheds new light on individual inertia in relation to transportation behavior. An enriched perspective rooted in Veblenian evolutionary economics (VEE) is used to construct a theoretical framework in order to analyze the processes at play in the formation and reinforcement of habits. The empirical study explores more specifically the synchronic processes strengthening the car-using habit. In addition to underlining the shortcomings of a ‘decision theory’ perspective to address urban transportation behaviors, we find that synchronic habits can have a significant effect on behavioral inertia. Our results suggest the existence of positive feedback between the development of synchronic habits, qualitative perceptions of driving times, and reinforcement of the car-using habit. The paper points out also that the diachronic dimension of habits would constitute another promising domain for further research on behavioral inertia in transportation.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2014
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2202053-6
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2021
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 17, No. 1 ( 2021-02), p. 71-89
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 17, No. 1 ( 2021-02), p. 71-89
    Abstract: This paper builds on the Ostroms' oeuvre to suggest that the binary Samuelsonian taxonomy of goods – or the ‘sterile dichotomy’, as Elinor Ostrom calls it – cannot serve as a reliable guide for public policy. Using the Ostroms' insights on co-production, institutional matching, and polycentricity, we argue that the ‘inherent’ nature of goods and their specific taxonomy are not static and definitive concepts but are instead contestable and dynamic features that are institutionally contingent. We explore four crucial mechanisms and/or contexts, not altogether unrelated, whereby the nature of goods becomes contestable and malleable: namely, (1) technological and geographical factors, (2) coproduction and entrepreneurial ingenuity, (3) bundling and unbundling of services, and (4) ideologies and regime shifts. This exercise has twofold purposes. First, we generalize the notion that there is nothing ‘inherent’ in the nature of goods and services and that they are fluid, heterogeneous, and malleable concepts. Second, we contribute to the debate on the provision of public goods and the role of civil society by highlighting the need for institutional malleability and diversity adaptive to changing technology, contexts, and institutional conditions.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2021
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2022
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 18, No. 4 ( 2022-08), p. 655-676
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 18, No. 4 ( 2022-08), p. 655-676
    Abstract: New institutional economics (NIE) studies institutions and how they emerge, operate, and evolve. They also include organizational arrangements, intended as modes of governing economic transactions. Universities offer an exciting ground for testing the role of different institutional arrangements (governance forms) in coordinating (academic) transactions. In a context of contractual incompleteness where production is characterized by a highly specialized nature and requires the cooperation among co-essential figures, we argue that shared governance models ( versus models with more concentrated authority) foster idiosyncratic investments in human capital and promotes performance. From the evolutionary viewpoint, we explain why institutions based on shared governance have developed within universities. The normative question of how universities should be governed is a debated issue in the literature. Since the 1980s, the new public management paradigm provides a theoretical framework that suggests analyzing university like firms. It is based on the firm's archetypical conception as top-down hierarchical organizations and as a descending sequence of principal–agent problems. We advance a different interpretation of the university–firm analogy leveraging on the NIE and its developments. To empirically analyze our hypothesis, we collected original data from Italian universities in 2015. We find that more shared decision-making processes are correlated with better research performance.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2022
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2010
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 6, No. 2 ( 2010-06), p. 167-190
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 6, No. 2 ( 2010-06), p. 167-190
    Abstract: This paper examines the fundamental nature of numbers as they are used in economic systems. In the framework proposed, number sequences are technological objects (‘tools’) that are constituted by both form and function. To do their job, number sequences have to have the necessary internal structure – all elements (e.g. symbols) of the sequence must be distinct from one another, and the sequence must be a progression. In addition, numerical toolkits have to have the right external structure – they must be situated in a social network of economic agents that confers on them quantitative functions (e.g. identifying set sizes). Number sequences are the product of multilevel evolutionary processes, including psychological selection that screens sequences for their learnability by human users. Number tools are a kind of capital; they are material systems that are as real as other everyday objects. Just as changing physical tools alters the structure of productive activity, so too changing number sequences alters cognitive, behavioral, and social routines.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2010
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2010
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 6, No. 3 ( 2010-09), p. 351-375
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 6, No. 3 ( 2010-09), p. 351-375
    Abstract: Integrating organization theory, organizational economics, and organizational law considerations, it is argued that the ‘nature of the firm’ can be more completely understood if it is considered a complete society-establishing contract, including constitutional pacts on procedures for the selection of actions, rather than a nexus of incomplete transactional contracts complemented by authority, power, or relational norms. The explanation is more general since firm-establishing contracts are a sub-set of those society-establishing contracts that are capable of regulating any venture in condition of high uncertainty and potential conflict, and because the constitutional regime adopted (authority-based, democratic, or other) becomes a specification of particular types of firms rather than part of the explanation of the firm. Evidence from published studies, as well as from newly gathered data on firm-founding contracts and other partnership establishing contracts (500 record database on large multi-party projects), document that actual contracts under uncertainty do fit the hypothesized pattern.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2010
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2202053-6
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2011
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 7, No. 2 ( 2011-06), p. 279-293
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 7, No. 2 ( 2011-06), p. 279-293
    Abstract: This paper offers an alternative to the view of the routines literature provided by T. Felin and N. J. Foss, ‘The Endogenous Origins of Experience, Routines and Organizational Capabilities: The Poverty of Stimulus’, published by the Journal of Institutional Economics . The emphasis here is on practice-based theories of organizational routines that are grounded in close, ethnographic observation of real routines. While this literature may be unfamiliar to some readers, it is relevant here because it specifically contradicts the core assertions made by Felin and Foss. Further, this literature provides a clear theoretical foundation for subsequent research on problems such as stability and change in routines, the nature of capabilities and dynamic capabilities, and complex ecologies of routines.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2011
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2005
    In:  Journal of Institutional Economics Vol. 1, No. 1 ( 2005-06), p. i-ii
    In: Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 1, No. 1 ( 2005-06), p. i-ii
    Abstract: Major shifts in thinking among economists and other social scientists in recent years have prepared the ground for the launch of the Journal of Institutional Economics . Within economics, for example, after a period of neglect from the earlier to the later decades of the twentieth century, the study of the nature and role of institutions has become a central topic. Explanations of economic growth and development used to focus on inputs, production functions, and outputs, often neglecting the institutional structures that constrain or empower individuals, and frame their incentives and disincentives. Accordingly, for a long time the firm was treated as a ‘black box’, with little regard to the structural determinants of its existence, boundaries, and performance. However, the study of the firm changed dramatically in the 1970s when Oliver Williamson, building on the earlier work of Ronald Coase and others, opened the black box to investigate the firm as an institution. Similarly, in a pioneering series of works, Douglass North has investigated the role of institutions in the historical development of the modern capitalism. There are many other examples of important achievements in this area, too numerous to mention here. The outcome is that institutions have become a central topic of analysis for economists.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1744-1374 , 1744-1382
    RVK:
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2005
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2007
    In:  Macroeconomic Dynamics Vol. 11, No. S1 ( 2007-11), p. 80-101
    In: Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 11, No. S1 ( 2007-11), p. 80-101
    Abstract: In various agent-based models, the stylized facts of financial markets (unit roots, fat tails, and volatility clustering) have been shown to emerge from the interactions of agents. However, the complexity of these models often limits their analytical accessibility. In this paper we show that even a very simple model of a financial market with heterogeneous interacting agents is capable of reproducing these ubiquitous statistical properties. The simplicity of our approach permits us to derive some analytical insights using concepts from statistical mechanics. In our model, traders are divided into two groups, fundamentalists and chartists , and their interactions are based on a variant of the herding mechanism introduced by A. Kirman (Ants, rationality, and recruitment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 137–156, 1993). The statistical analysis of simulated data points toward long-term dependence in the autocorrelations of squared and absolute returns and hyperbolic decay in the tail of the distribution of raw returns, both with estimated decay parameters in the same range as those of empirical data. Theoretical analysis, however, excludes the possibility of “true” scaling behavior because of the Markovian nature of the underlying process and the boundedness of returns. The model, therefore, only mimics power law behavior. Similarly to the phenomenological volatility models analyzed by LeBaron (Stochastic volatility as a simple generator of apparent financial power laws and long memory, Quantitative Finance 1, 621–631, 2001), the usual statistical tests are not able to distinguish between true and pseudo-scaling laws in the dynamics of our artificial market.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1365-1005 , 1469-8056
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2007
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1501533-6
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