Abstract: The search for a means to eliminate the impact of a strike on the public without weakening the bargaining power of both management and union at the bargaining table gave rise to the statutory strike formula, also known as the non-stoppage strike formula. ORIGIN The idea was first suggested in 1949 by two Harvard professors : LeRoy Marceau and Richard A. Musgrave. (1) The following year, Professor George W. Goble ( 2 ) defined a concrete way to use the idea and in 1953, Neil W. Chamberlain ( 3 ), the well-known Yale economist, approved the principles of the formula, defining his personal view on the way to use it. In 1959, David B. McCalmont ( 4 ) published several articles on the subject without knowing at that time that the idea was not a new one. NATURE Despite these different approaches, one can draw up a profile of the Non-Stoppage Strike Formula, taking into account the four given sources : — there is no work stoppage; — the public does not have to suffer any production or service interruption; — the parties are supposed to be in the same relative bargaining positions as if the workers had walked out; — the parties are supposed to impose on each other the same economic burden as if they were involved in a regular strike. The basic hypothesis of that formula is as follows : « Aside from the inconvenience which the public suffers, the only direct result of a strike is to inflict an economic loss on both the company and the workers. It costs them both money » (...) « If therefore a system could be devised which would permit the union to inflict the identical loss upon the company without a work stoppage, the bargaining function of the strike would be preserved, yet the conflict with the public interest would be avoided. » ( 5 ) ELEMENTS Setting up of the Formula Marceau and Musgrave as well as Chamberlain propose the use of the formula when a conflict between management and the union is judged by the State as being an emergency dispute. The law would then force the parties to use the non-stoppage strike formula. Goble suggests the existence of a law defining the method of application of the system, available on a voluntary basis to the parties involved in the conflict. Finally, McCalmont thinks that there is no need for any legislation concerning the non-stoppage strike formula. The system could be used following the will of the parties. However, the State or any public intervention would be avoided except where agreed upon by the parties. It would be more appropriate to name the first case « statutory strike » and the two others, « non-stoppage strike ». We will use that latter term. Economic Penalties During a work stoppage, the workers are willing to give up their income in order to force the employer to accept their demands. The strike without work stoppage takes that fact into account. The workers keep on working though they receive only a part of their income. On the other hand, the employer gives up a part of the company's earnings. They negotiate under that pressure until they reach an agreement. There is no work stoppage. The same economic pressure as in a regular work stoppage forces the parties towards an agreement. How can it be done ? Marceau and Musgrave recommend requiring the company « to pay out (for all work performed) at a rate so high that the company would stand in the same profit and loss position in which it would have stood, had the work stoppage gone ahead » and the workers would receive « a rate so low that, in actual fact, they would be under the same economic pressure that a strike would exert ». ( 6 ) Since they keep on working, they must receive a little more than that if one is to avoid placing the parties in a worse position than if the workers had really walked out. Goble would prefer to retain 25 per cent of the workers' income and 25 per cent of the managers' income plus the net profits of the company operating during a non-stoppage strike. In order to maintain the relative bargaining power of the parties, Chamberlain proposes the retention of 50 per cent of the workers' income and 50 per cent of the fixed costs of the company during the non-stoppage strike. Taking into account the fact that the employer does not lose his market and that the workers have no equal advantage, another penalty would be added to the employer by retaining all his net profits. The penalties suggested by McCalmont are much alike those of Marceau and Musgrave. They would be as follows : 50 per cent of the owner's income and 50 per cent of the difference between the company's income with and without a work stoppage ; the latter amount being defined in the expired collective agreement to avoid the problems of setting it up. Use of the Trust Fund Receipts On this specific point, Marceau and Musgrave, Chamberlain, and McCalmont suggest that these amounts be retained each week during the non-stoppage strike negotiations until the agreement is reached. Goble adds the possibility of the parties recovering all the money withheld if they settle within 90 days. If not, another period of the same length with the same penalties would begin until the agreement is reached. Musgrave, Chamberlain and McCalmont would use these amounts to finance public services in the community or to help finance the general needs of the government (strike tax). Marceau suggests using the money withheld to pay retroactive payments to the parties, hoping that this will bring them to agree upon the formula. EXPERIENCES As far as we have been able to determine, there is only one collective agreement which includes a non-stoppage strike clause. It was signed by Dunbar Furniture Corporation (Indiana) and Local 222 of the Upholsterers International Union (AFL-CIO) on May 1, 1964. It can be described as follows : « The strike-work provisions are activated on receipt of written notice of a strike or lockout. The provisions immediately ban such action; reinstate the terms of the basic contract (whose expiration is a condition for a strike or lockout); and stipulate that the ban will continue during the first twelve payroll weeks after the notice is received. Until a settlement is reached within this period, if it is, half of the weekly earnings of bargaining unit employees (including holiday and vacation pay that may become due) is withheld by the company. This money is placed in a 'strike work trust fund', for which the First Bank of Berne is the fiduciary. The company also turns over to the fund an amount equal to the total withheld from the employees' pay ». When the basic contract dispute is settled, the company and its employees can regain the money turned over to the trust according to the following schedule : Settlement during the       proportion of money returned     first 6 weeks                         100%    7th — 9th week                     75%    10th — 11th week                 50%    12th week                        25%    After the 12th week               none If the twelfth week ends without a settlement, the basic contract can be terminated on written notice and a regular strike or lockout can begin. If such notice is not received by the end of the first following week (the thirteenth), the contract is renewed automatically and without change. In this case the contract is not terminable until a year from its original, pre-notice expiration date. ( 7 ) Since their agreement on that formula, the parties have renegotiated their contract but without having to use the strike-work provisions. There is another experience of non-stoppage strike which took place in Miami, Florida. It was not part of the agreement but was a decision taken by the parties after three days of regular strike. ( 8 ) The Miami Transit Company and its striking employees agreed to provide free bus service for the city. The bus drivers agreed to provide their services free and the employer was to pay for fuel and maintenance of the buses. The drivers were not to receive any subsidies during the period other than those payments authorized by the union. The system worked for only three days and ended because the bus company president charged that his investigators had found some drivers accepting tips from riders. They returned to a formal strike. ( 9 ) This case is so particular that it could not be extended to other sectors of our economy. It is presented for its originality rather than for its possible application elsewhere. PLAN ADVANTAGES AS ESTIMATED BY THE PROMOTORS The great winner with the formula is the public because it does not have to change its practices as there is no work stoppage. However, in the opinion of the proposers, both the workers and management gain with the formula. Let us now turn to the advantages for them. ( 10 ) For the workers : — they receive a bigger pay during the non-stoppage strike than if they had walked out; — the demoralization which comes from being idle, as required by the regular strike, is not present; — the bad feeling and dangers of the picket line are eliminated; — the risk of the company beating the strike by employing strike breakers is avoided; — the bargaining power of the union is not weakened since they are supposed to maintain the same economic pressure as if they had gone on strike; — It is an excellent occasion for the union to improve its public image. For the employer : — the damage to property, which sometimes results from a picket line, are eliminated; — all expenses incidental to a shut down are eliminated; — the disruption which comes to the operation of the business, to its market position and to the satisfying of customers is prevented; — the temptation to resort to unpopular methods for breaking the strike is not present; — the good reputation of the company is maintained since it is able to fulfill its obligations. It seems that each of the parties gains with the formula. Let us now take a look at its weaknesses. COMMENTS ON THE NON-STOPPAGE STRIKE FORMULA The Nature of the Formula Insufficient knowledge of the nature of the strike. The promotors of the formula postulate that the strike has only an economic finality and that the greatest damage inflicted on the employer during a work stoppage is the immediate loss of profit. So saying, they take into account only one dimension of the strike. They omit its social, psychological and political functions. The immediate loss of profit is not the worst thing that can happen to an employer during a work stoppage. The employer fears the long-run impact rather more than the « here and now » consequences of the strike. He fears, among other things, the loss of his market. On the side of the workers, sometimes the traditional strike plays an important role of defrustration. Insufficient knowledge of the nature of union activity. The non-stoppage strike formula ignores the role of unionism. The strike is the perfect way to enhance the workers' cohesion and solidarity. If one is to remove the right to walk out, then, by the same token, the union loses what makes its strength. Modified bargaining power One cannot know if the formula maintains the relative bargaining power of the parties. What makes the strength of a party at the bargaining table is a set of factors. Some can be expressed in money terms but others cannot. The formula fails by converting all of these factors into money terms. Moreover, it reduces the penalties for both parties compared to the traditional strike. The smaller the penalty, the greater the will to resist and the longer the conflict. Public opinion does not intervene since it is not disturbed by a work stoppage. Danger of bad consequences The authors agree on the fact that the right to strike is not permanently lost since the parties can remove such a no-stoppage clause from the agreement in later collective bargaining. Once agreed upon, however, it seems that it will not be removed. On the other hand, the workers have to use their right to strike if they wish to convince the employer and themselves of their strength. With the formula, it seems that they will lose their ability to walk out. Once embarked, it becomes a vicious circle. Such a formula can incite the rank and file workers to slow down if they are not convinced of the pressure they exert during a non-stoppage strike. Also, the company would be attracted by the idea of cutting its product prices since it has to give up all its net profits. There would be, finally, the possibility that the workers would quit their jobs as they would receive only « a half day's pay for a full day's work ». Problems emerging from the implementation of the formula During a strike without work stoppage, the workers are willing to renounce a part of their income. What happens to the workers hired once it has begun ? If they receive full pay, it will affect the moral of the other workers. If they receive only a part of it, they will not accept work there. Since the Marceau and Musgrave article in 1949, there has been only one agreement containing such a clause. Moreover, according to the views of the president of the company, sooner or later, industrial and union leaders are going « to have to find a better way to resolve industrial disputes ». Details of Application Setting up Three means of setting up the formula are proposed : a coercive law, a permissive law and a decision of the parties without any legislation. The first would be effective in avoiding the appearance of the strike but the conflict would remain. The two others leave the parties free to choose the formula or not. By doing so, one can be sure that it will not be very useful since nobody believes in its effectiveness. Determination of the penalties The penalties imposed on the parties should be determined by public referees (Marceau and Musgrave, Chamberlain, Goble). The employers will resist such intrusions in their private affairs. What about the determination of the net profit ? What will motivate the employer to operate efficiently if he is to give up all his net profit ? Goble proposes retaining 25 per cent of the manager's income. Will they accept a worse situation than during a regular strike ? What is to prevent the company from distributing at the end of the year a bonus covering that lost income ? As far as the Dunbar Formula is concerned, it is simple, but its equity is doubtful. Use of the trust fund receipts The Dunbar formula seems to encourage the parties to settle early (within six weeks) since they would then recover all the money withheld. In the other case, there is no such pressure. Marceau's idea of using the money to make retroactive payments is not valuable as there would no longer be a penalty. To sum up, let us say that if we stick to the idea, we give an unworkable means of imposing penalties, and if we define easy means of imposing penalties, we stand away from the formula. Annexe DUNBAR FURNITURE STRIKE WORK AGREEMENT This Strike Work Agreement, made and entered into 20th day of May, 1964, by and between the Dunbar Furniture Corporation of Indiana, Berne, Indiana, its successors or assigns, hereinafter called the company. and the Upholsterers' International Union of North America affiliated with the AFL-CIO, hereinafter designated as the Union acting through its agency, Upholsterers' Furniture and Novelty Workers' Local Union No. 222, and under charter from the said Union, for itself and in behalf of the employees now employed and hereinafter employed by the company and collectively designated herein as the employees, hereinafter called the union. LABOR AGREEMENT The company and the union have a Collective Bargaining Agreement and it is agreed that this Strike Work Agreement and the attached Fiduciary Agreement are subsidiary agreements to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. PROCEDURE NOTICE In case the union decides to strike or the company decides to have a lockout after a collective bargaining agreement expires it is agreed that the Strike Work procedure as outlined in the agreement will be in effect. The union will send official written notice of the decision to strike to the company or the company will send official written notice of the lockout to the local union. Starting with the first payroll week after the notice is received the Strike Work procedure will be in effect as outlined in this agreement. The collective bargaining agreement is reinstated and will continue; in force for the entire Strike Work period. WORK DEDUCTIONS There will be no stoppage of work. All employees will continue to work during the Strike Work period. One half of the earnings of all employees in the unit will be withheld and placed in the Strike Work Trust Fund in the custody of the Bank named in the Fiduciary Agreement. The company will place in the fund each week an amount of money equal to the total amount paid by all employees that week. PERIODS — REFUNDS FIRST PERIOD — SIX WEEKS — ALL MONEY RETURNED If the Strike Work is settled inside of six weeks, all of the money will be returned to the employees and the company. The bank will donate its services. SECOND PERIOD — THREE WEEKS — 75% RETURNED If the Strike Work is settled in the next three weeks, 75% of the money paid will be returned to the employees and the company, less 10c per check issued in the distribution process. THIRD PERIOD — TWO WEEKS — 50% RETURNED If the Strike Work is settled in the next two weeks, 50% of the money will be returned to the employees and the company, less 10c per check issued in the distribution process. FOURTH PERIOD — ONE WEEK — 25% RETURNED If the Strike Work is settled in the next one week, 25% of the money will be returned to the employees and the company, less 10c per check issued in the distribution process. OLD FASHIONED STRIKE OR LOCKOUT If the Strike Work has not been settled by the end of the fourth period (12th week) then no money will be refunded. The Strike Work Agreement and the Collective Bargaining Agreement may then be terminated and also there may be an old fashioned strike or lockout by written notice of either party to the other. AGREEMENT RENEWED If no such notice has been received by either party at the end of the 13th week after the Strike work started then the last agreement will be automatically renewed without change for one year. The expiration date will then be one year from the written date of expiration in the last written agreement. ARBITRATION Any dispute as to the meaning or application of the agreement between the company and the union or with the fiduciary that cannot be settled otherwise will be arbitrated except only as is provided in Article IX of the fiduciary agreement, if either party to the dispute so requests. The arbitration will be under the rules and procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. RULES The following rules will be in effect with the start of the first payroll week of a strike or lockout under this Strike Work Agreement. RETIREES In case an employee is eligible to retire and does retire, then the money that he has paid into the fund will be refunded to him when he retires. Written proof and authorization will be given to the Fiduciary in jointly signed statement. SICK OR INJURED If an employee is sick or injured and received benefits under the UIU Health and Welfare Fund or Workmen's Compensation or other statutory industrial compensation funds, the benefits so received will not be considered as wages. The money that he has paid into the fund will remain there pending his return. In case it is proved that he is totally disabled then the money that he has paid into the fund will be returned to him when he retires. The Fiduciary will be given proof and authorization as outlined in A above. When an employee that has been sick or injured returns to work, then he will receive a refund or will additional money so that he will pay the same percent of his wages as other employees. The payments, if any, can be divided into four weekly instalments. QUITS In case an employee quits or is discharged during the time a Strike Work is going on, he will forfeit and lose all claim to any money that he has paid into the fund. If he should be rehired, he will start as a new employee without seniority. If the amount that he had paid into the fund was a smaller percent of his weekly wage than others paid, he will pay the difference before starting to work, to the company and the company will deposit the money so received in the fund. NO STRIKE OR SLOW DOWN It is agreed that there will be no strike stoppage or slow down or restrictions of output during the time that the Strike Work is in effect. In case any such action should occur the company may at its option discipline or discharge any or all of the people taking part in a strike, stoppage, slow down or restriction of output. In case such action by the company is taken to arbitration to sustain its action it shall only be necessary for the company to prove that the employees so dealt with did actually take part in the above strike, stoppage, slow down or restriction of output. NO LAW SUIT It is agreed that the International Union or the Local Union or any of its agents or officers, or any employees will not bring any legal action against the company or the fiduciary. The company will not bring any legal action against the International or Local Union or any of their officers or members or against the fiduciary. NO CONTRIBUTIONS 1 — During the Strike Work period it is agreed that the International Union and its affiliates shall not directly or indirectly render financial assistance to any of the employees in the bargaining unit. 2 — The company agrees that it will not solicit or accept any contributions from any association or from any other source. 3 — The employees agree that they will not solicit or accept any contributions or help from local merchants or any other source. If it is discovered that this section has been violated the guilty party shall pay double the amount received into the trust fund. ENFORCEMENT This paragraph shall be applicable not withstanding the termination of this agreement or any statute of limitations. The accused party, however, if it denies the accusation may go to arbitration in an attempt to prove its innocence. The arbitration will be held as is provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement with the company and union sharing equally in the cost of the arbitration. The arbitrator will decide only whether or not the accusation is correct and it is agreed that his decision is final. DURATION The Strike Work Agreement may be amended, changed or abolished by mutual agreement between the company and the union. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereunto set their hands and seals as hereinafter stated, on this the 20th day of May 1964. (1) Marceau, LeRoy and Musgrave, Richard A., «  Strikes in Essential Industries, A Way Out » in Harvard Business Review, Vol. 27, No. 3, May 1949, pp. 286-292. (2) Goble, George W., « The Non-Stoppage Strike » in Current Economic Comment, Vol. XII, August 1950, pp. 3-12 and in Labour Law Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1951, pp. 105-114. (3) Chamberlain, Neil W., Social Responsibility and Strike, New York, Harper Brothers, 1953, p. 293. (4) McCalmont, D.B., « The Semi Strike » in Industrial and Labour Relations Review, January 1962, pp. 191-208. (5) Marceau and Musgrave, op. cit., p. 287. (6) Marceau and Musgrave, op. cit., p. 287. (7) The Conference Board Record, August 1964, p. 41. (See the text of the said agreement, p. 304.) (8) New York Times, October 4, 1960, p. 13. (9) New York Times, October 10, 1960, p. 14. (10) See Goble, op. cit., p. 108.

Abstract: In view of the new labour relations « atmosphere » in Western Europe, which was described at the beginning of this study, and of the institutional and legal frameworks characterizing them at this time, how do these industrial relations systems fit into the economy as a whole and the political life of the countries under review ? Some comments are required in order to pinpoint them in the dynamics of national contexts within which they now come. INCREASING PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC POWERS IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MATTERS One of the principal points which distinguish most European countries from the United States and Canada is the much greater role played by the public powers in economic and social matters, especially since the end of the last war. As a matter of fact, the abandonment of liberalism by the public powers, while increasing their role in labour relations, has carried the action of the social partners from the industrial level to the national level, where meetings are made within vast « co-operation » or at least « dialogue » organizations : The Central Economic Council and the National Labour Council in Belgium ; the Labour Foundation and the Economic and Social Council in the Netherlands ; the Economic and Social Council, and the Superior Commission for Collective Agreements and Plan in France ; the National Economic Development Council in England, etc. In those countries, such as Germany and Scandinavia, where the public powers seem to intervene least they are just as effective indirectly and sometimes rather brutally in labour relations, when the social partners appear to be incapable of satisfying the political will of the governments. This occurred on several occasions and even very recently in Denmark. When the Employer's Confederation and the LO could not come to an agreement in Denmark during the negotiations of 1962-63, the government intervened and passed an Act which simply extended the existing agreement for two more years. In Belgium and in the Netherlands, what is remarkable is the positive contribution made, in spite of differing interests and ideologies, by the social partners to the effective operation of organizations such as the National Labour Council and the Central Economic Council in Belgium, and the Labour Foundation and the Economic and Social Council in Holland. It is also the intelligent contribution they make and the systematic canvassing of their participation, advice and resources by the public powers. In France, labour participation in various public organizations such as the Economic and Social Council, the Superior Commission for Collective Agreements and Plan, was far less spontaneous and often rather weak. At first sight, this may seem to be rather paradoxical, if one knows that the C.G.T., even before the last war, had already submitted a claim for the Economic and Social Council. But with the post-war political climate, the split of 1947 and the takeover of the C.G.T. by the Communists, and with the increased power of management coupled with its first opposition to State intervention, French labour, because of its congenital weakness, and its attitudes against politics and for marked disputes could not give the same co-operation as in Belgium or Holland. The fact remains that in France, as elsewhere in continental Europe, trade unions, while maintaining their ideological positions abandoned to all intents and purposes by most other European trade unions, increasingly accept to participate in spite of the fundamental dilemma which now confronts them. 1 It goes without saying that this is especially the case of the C.F.T.C. and the F.O., although the C.G.T. itself is re-orienting its attitudes in the face of the ineluctable nature of institutionalized consultation. 2 In our opinion, Great Britain presents the most difficult case in co-operation at the national level. Governmental attempts such as the National Incomes Commission have given practically no results at all. English management is opposed to government intrusion in matters related to income and labour relations. Until now, labour have rejected the concept of a national incomes policy and whereas the T.U.C. adopted a slightly more conciliatory attitude towards the National Economic Development Council, it has not obtained the complete backing of its members. In Great Britain, a concerted economy policy has not been endorsed without reservations. Management and labour have a deep-rooted tradition of self help and this has done nothing to prepare co-operation with the public powers in economic and social matters within the framework of government policies. It is still the era of « collective laissez-faire », an expression used by professor Kahn-Freund. 3 Structurally, in our opinion, the social partners are not as well equipped in Great Britain as in the other European countries at this time for co-operation at the national level. Even though from the point of view of membership and power in making demands on the labour market, trade unions are more powerful than they are in other countries, the obsolete structures of their frameworks, the multiplicity of organizations, the lack of cohesion in leadership and the little control that the T.U.C. has over its affiliated bodies, are all factors of which the labour movement in Britain is trying to find its essence within itself and cannot, at the national level, project a solid and unified image with the other social classes, public opinion and government. Management also has the same problems. Organizations such as the « British Employers' Confederation » to name only one do not have even the shadow of the powers of their equivalent organizations in other European countries over affiliated members. There is therefore less inclination to accept without reservations any great intervention by the public powers since there was not developed truly representative structures such as would be required by dialogue at summit. In our opinion, as long as English management and trade unionism will not have achieved greater representation at the summit, through serious internal reforms of plans, structures and powers (and this would not seem at the moment to be the case), 4 we do not believe that the union-management-government triangle can operate as effectively as in the other European countries. THE SOCIAL PARTNERS AND POLITICS In Europe, trade unions seem to co-operate more actively and with less hesitation when they are strong politically. This is the case in Sweden and Denmark where trade unions have very strong links with social democratic parties, and these alliances give them a quasi-public status. This is also the case in Belgium and the Netherlands. In Germany, France and Italy, and especially in the two latter countries, there has been some tendency for labour confederations to gradually shift away from political parties, as the economic situation permitted them to take more effective direct economic action on the labour market, popular ideologies were watered down with the rise in standards of living, the public parties whatever their political affiliation intervened more in the economy and labour relations and the way was opened for effective participation and dialogue within councils and commissions of all kinds, which « institutionalized » in the manner of speaking demands at the national level. It must be noted that in Germany, as indeed in France, socialist parties were in opposition and political leaders such as Dr. Erhard were committed to an unplanned economic policy ( Neo-Liberalism ). Trade unions, at least through their official leaders, seemed to accept the situation and thus consider their labour organizations primarily as business concerns. There was fear in all quarters in Germany of excessive concentration of decision centers, which could lead in time to the destruction of democratic liberties so cruelly crushed under the Hitler regime. It should be pointed out that, in view of the present political climate in Germany in social and economic matters, as is indeed the case in France, management now is most powerful with the State in implementing government wishes in this field. Although Great Britain's problems are primarily economic, they are further complicated by economic factors. To take only one example, trade unions in this country conserved more ideological content than other European countries, however paradoxical this may appear to be at first sight. The close ties they maintained with the labour party gave rise to two different problems, the first of which was clearly defined by Bernard Donoughue : « When the government is conservative. the unions have the difficult task of helping to improve the economic record of their political opponents. Co-operation with a labour government will be easier psychologically, yet the basic economic problems will remain ; the unions will still be required to subordinate sectional interest — which may mean limiting the autonomy of the unions in the wages field. Some trade unionists may find this as galling to have their autonomy limited by the politicians they may finance as by those they fight. But can they afford to stand aside from the plans of any government, whatever its complexion, which are aimed at improving the economy of this country, on which the long-term welfare of all trade unionists depends » 5 THE ADVENT OF MANAGEMENT As was stated at the beginning, the high degree of organization in management constitutes one of the traditional characteristics of European labour relations. We cannot stress this too much, in view of the situation in which Canadian management now finds itself in matters of organization, due to increasing intervention of the public powers in the economy. In certain countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, management organization is solid and coherent and has existed for a long time, i.e., since the beginning of the century. As early as 1919, countries such as Great Britain and France witnessed the formation of employer organization extending beyond the framework of one industry. However, with the establishment of the British Employers' Confederation in 1919, Great Britain obtained much sooner than France a coherent management structure. This does not take into account various organizations dedicated in different spheres (labour, regional, industrial, commercial, etc.) to the defence and promotion of the interests of the business world and constituting a very extensive network of representative organizations offering to their members professional, education and technical services. In the matter in which we are concerned, the most significant phenomenon in post-war years was the gradual accession of European management to positions of prestige and power within their respective national communities, after the marked set-back they had suffered during the depression of the thirties, the take-over of power by fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, and the revenge taken by democratic forces of the left after the Allied victory of 1945 over the Axis powers. Management confederations in Germany, while they were outlawed by the occupation forces until 1948, were reconstituted as of that year, in spite of the limitations that were still imposed on them, and formed in 1950, under the provisions of the fundamental Act of 1949, which was an approximate recast of the 1919 Act, the « Federal Union of Employer Associations », commonly known as the German Employer Associations Confederation. There are also boards of trade, industrial associations grouped in the German Industries Federation, which has jurisdiction over economic matters, while the German Employer Associations Confederation is limited to social matters, the latter term however including all labour relations problems, particularly salaries. Management organization in Germany is extremely strong and influential. Amongst the countries under review, German management probably has the most power vis-à-vis the public powers and public opinion. The fact that the declared policy of the Bonn government in economic and social matters corresponds to free enterprise policy and Neo-capitalism is obviously responsible to a considerable degree for this situation. France also offers a good example of the gradual accession of European management to a new status which is acknowledged more and more. Traditionally, as we have seen, French management has been individualistic, largely composed of craftmen, conservative and paternalistic to the extreme, organized more or less in relations to other European countries, often routinish in its management functions and labour policies. When Leon Blum took power with his Front Populaire in 1936, with the serious social crisis that France was then undergoing, an initial attempt was made to achieve a greater and more efficient structure for French management through a transformation of the French Production General Confederation, which became the French Management General Confederation and included not only big industry but also intermediate and small industry as well as trade, and adopted by the same token a structure similar to that of the C.G.T. both in the professional and geographical spheres. The Matignon Agreement had shown that French management was loath to make any concession whatever to trade unions and it was only under the pressure of circumstances that certain well established positions had been abandoned ( temporarily ) to labour representatives in connection with union recognition, collective agreements, social security and salaries. While French enterprise always showed strong hesitation for the great reforms that followed Liberation, such as the establishment of a social security in 1945-46, and about the same time for the Plan, to such an extent that it was stated that these measures were passed somewhat « in their absence », their attitudes changed very gradually ; they shifted increasingly towards and admitted an interested acceptance, to a point where they no longer questioned the very principle of such measures. More and more, the C.N.P.F. participated, through interprofessional agreements with the principal labour confederation, to the establishment of a negotiated social security system designed to supplement the minimums provided for in the statutes. As relations between organized management and government agencies improved and as the dialogue developed, management began to lose its distrust of state intervention, objectives became more realistic and co-operation increased. Today, as was stated before, labour confederations consider this as collusion of sorts between the public powers and the business world. The fact remains, as was the case for labour, that the dialogue is becoming institutionalized and that both parties are becoming more functional and less emotional and less ideological. According to the observers, French management is in the process of completely rebuilding its image in social quarters and in the very eyes of labour, which is no small achievement. This arrival point for German and French management is precisely what British employers seem to be lacking. It may be that government institutions such as the N.E.D.C., should this experience be successful, as we feel it will be, could give similar results on that side of the Channel. It should be added, although we cannot stress the point, that the situation would appear to be similar in Belgium where the Belgian Industries Federation appears to be very influential even though, in contrast with the C.N.P.F. in France, it is not as representative of economic life, being limited to industry. 6 It should also be noted that management is very influential in the Netherlands. In all phases of labour relations, as well as in legislative texts dealing with them, for example collective negotiations, joint representation at the industry and enterprise levels, co-decision is non-existent and safeguards are always included in connection with management's rights in governing industry. STRUCTURE PROBLEMS One of the most obvious consequences of management solidarity in Europe is that, in spite of the centrifugal forces of today's economic situation (full employment, increased productivity, local pressures for individual negotiations, real salaries exceeding and often by far the regulated minimums negotiated at the level of the confederation, etc.) negociations remain centralized in most cases. With the enterprise agreements of the Reynaud type in France and generalized breaches in the official ceilings at the local level in the country as a whole, one would be led to believe that the « national » agreement, gradually losing its substance, would in fact lose all its significance. In fact, North Americans would consider that this phenomenon is already very pronounced. However, management resistance has succeeded until now in maintaining the traditional negotiations systems and without analysing the economic and social reasons for this, it does not appear that any significant movement towards American decentralization is now being initiated. 7 It should be stated in this connection that the rational representatives of labour confederation in all of the countries under review are in agreement on maintaining this practice and would not be partial to any dispersing of the powers they now have. The public powers who are now involved in delicate programs of balance and development, are not ready apparently to participate without reservations in overthrowing existing institutions. In our opinion, however, such a system gives rise to two serious problems. Firstly, the absence of official trade unions at the enterprise level (at least in certain countries) coupled with prosperity and its benefits, in any event obtained or granted unilaterally at the local level, has tended to undermine labour prestige at the base and with wage-earners in general, so that, in certain countries such as France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain, labour membership has tended to decrease and recruitment of new wage-earner classes gradually became more difficult. 8 Furthermore it appears to be clear that in Europe there are serious communications problems at the inter-organization level between labour membership and national leadership. The problem is particularly acute in France, the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain. All the action is at a very high level, where complexities are such that they could not be understood by ordinary members at the factory level. Contacts are lost between members and the general staff, who operate in official spheres and is sometimes surprised of the spontaneous reaction at the labour level. 9 The solution to these problems suggested by B.C. Roberts for Great Britain but, in our opinion, applicable to other European countries, might be to have labour organizations become officially present at the enterprise level, to give a certain status to collective agreements at this level and to give them a new meaning, while maintaining or even increasing in some countries, a stronger authority in hierarchy from top to bottom, in order to ensure better control and greater flexibility to labour industrial activity. 10 CONCLUSION In spite of the numerous limitations imposed on a general study, one dominant concept stands out quite clearly, in our opinion, from the whole of labour relations systems under review, if we consider them from the point of view of their capability for labour-management-government co-operation. It is that, in spite of drawbacks, which are sometimes serious, that we might find in certain countries at the level of the structures in a prosperity context and at the level of labour democracy conceived in ideal terms, European industrial relations systems in most of the countries under review seem to be more capable of integration in general government social and economic policies than our North American systems would appear to be. Undoubtedly, all is not perfect, far from it, and sometimes major adjustments would be needed. But essential institutions are already operating with a surprising degree of effectiveness ; mentalities in large part are adapting themselves to the new contexts, a quasi-universal desire, and one could say a divided will to understand the problems and solve them, are as many factors which impress a foreign observer in Europe. Amongst others, two basic reasons could, in our opinion, account for this situation. Firstly, the very nature of the systems under review has brought the social partners in Europe to develop a keen sense and a genuine anxiety for the « Community » implications of their decisions and behavior in collective relations and in achieving their group interests. One is impressed by the broad points of view taken by each partner in evaluating his own interests and his particular problems. They are always considered in the greater perspective of general economic balance and growth problems to which it is readily admitted that, in the long run, the fate of the various corporative groups is linked. This does not prevent labour unions from presenting demands but they always do so within these general « limitations », a better distribution of power and income for themselves and their members. A sense of self discipline which old style labour leaders might consider as an abdication or weakness but which, in our opinion, is essential to an era of advanced and increasingly interdependent economy, seems to characterize the attitudes of most European labour movements. Considering the problems in a broader and long-term perspective there is a growing tendency to « objectivate » their own demands through research facilities of a static and scientific nature. In this connection, it is interesting to note the great role played by governmental agencies set up in the various European countries to look into economic and social problems since at least 10 or 15 years : economic and social councils, expert groups, national accounting services, plans, labour market offices, etc. In recent years, study bureaus were established by the various confederations, composed of university professors and specialists and embracing practically all aspects of the problems facing the labour movement, such as The Economic and Social Study Bureau of the F.O. and the Research and Economic Action Bureau of the C.F.T.C. Finally, in some sectors, inter-union organizations were developed with the help of the government, notably the Inter-union Study Bureau of the textile industry, operating on behalf of the F.O., C.F.T.C. and C.G.C. On the management side, an example would be the study and research center for chiefs of enterprise established in 1953 by the French National Management Council in order to promote training of chiefs of enterprise through cyclical studies, discussions, meetings and seminars. Finally, for the countries of the European Economic Community, the latter factor is important and forces to some extent the social partners of the member states to broaden their horizons and develop between themselves a discussion and adjustment atmosphere in view of economic problems which, while remaining of a competitive nature are nevertheless more and more integrated. The economic prosperity, to which the various European « communities » have contributed, has made the partners optimistic and this facilitates arrangements and compromise. It would seem that, in these countries, there is no antagonism or difficulty between the social partners as well as between member states, which cannot be resolved by reasoned compromise and pooling of imaginative resources. The Common Market has not yet considerably altered the components of the various national labour relations systems. However, the common institutions it helped to establish, the basic agreements made possible by the Rome Treaty on various questions, the other agreements signed by member states of other communities, the far-reaching studies undertaken on many problems of primary interest to the social partners, all this new « sociology of European social law » to borrow Professor Arthur Doucy's expression, 11 already seem to be underlying a yet unknown evolution in labour relations institutional and legal frameworks in Europe towards greater cohesion and increasing awareness of the vaster groups and their requirements. (1) « The fourth plan ( 1962-65 ) witnessed a renewal of labour participation : 281 persons belonging to four big confederations were appointed to commissions and working groups' », in : J.D. REYNAUD, op. cit., p. 238. (2) Having maintained its attitude of opposition to the fourth plan until the eve of its 1963 congress, the C.G.T. witnessed at this congress a rather radical change in tone and Benoit Franchon implicitly rejected total opposition in his report. (3) « The belief in the value of collective bargaining is held with almost religious fervour », cited by W.F. FRANK, The Drift Towards a British National Wages Policy, in Current Law and Social Problems, Vol. III, Toronto, 1963, p. 73. (4) B.C. ROBERTS, op. cit., pp. 20 and seq. (5) BERNARD DONOUGHUE and JANET ALKER, Trade Unions in a Changing Society, P.E.P., Vol. XXIX, No. 472, London, 1963, p. 195. (6) This is also the case for the British B.E.C., the German Employer Associations Confederation and the Italian Confindustria. (7) It seems that the tendency in Denmark is towards greater centralization. In 1962, both sides agreed to negotiate first at the confederation level and then at the level of the various sectors to adapt the master agreement while prior to this negotiations were carried out at lower levels before agreement was reached at the summit. (8) On this subject, see ARTHUR ROSS, Prosperity and Labor Relations in Europe : The Case of West Germany, the Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. LXXVI, August 1962, pp. 338 and seq. (9) A recent example was in the Netherlands where tension which led to an increase of the salaries set by the Labour Foundation last year, through a certain « rebellion » of a few big employers, surprised even national labour leaders. (10) B.C. ROBERTS, op. cit., pp. 8-13. (11) ARTHUR DOUCY in « Éléments de droit social européen  », by LEON-ELI TROCLET, Institute of Sociology of the Free University of Brussels, Preliminary Edition, Brussels, 1963, Foreword, p. X.