In:
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Vol. 57, No. 5 ( 2009-10-01), p. 781-795
Abstract:
The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde's criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus Willaschek's Moorean compatibilism, I argue that our ordinary notion of agency commits us to genuine two-way abilities, i. e. to abilities to do otherwise given the same past and laws of nature. Against Christoph Jäger's defence of van Inwagen's consequence argument, I insist that this argument for incompatibilism is seriously flawed and that libertarians are well-advised not to base their position upon it.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
2192-1482
,
0012-1045
DOI:
10.1524/dzph.2009.57.5.781
Language:
English
Publisher:
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Publication Date:
2009
detail.hit.zdb_id:
201128-1
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2226913-7
SSG:
5,1
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