In:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 19, No. 1 ( 1989-03), p. 83-87
Abstract:
In a recent article in this journal, Barbara Lariviere offers a very useful distinction between two ways of understanding the claims that Leibniz, or relational theorists in general, might wish to make about the nature of motion and the structure of space and time; viz., (L 1 ) There is no real inertial structure to space-time. and (L 2 ) There is a real inertial structure to space-time, but it is dynamical rather than absolute. Citing the authority of Weyl, the author argues that L 1 is untenable; indeed, the argument purports to show that if L 1 were true, then there would be no coherent basis for a theory of motion, not even a relational theory. My main goal in this note is to point out why this argument is mistaken while at the same time sketching the real reason why the relational conception of motion is untenable. In addition I will offer a few remarks about the relevance of L 2 to the absolute-relational controvery.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0045-5091
,
1911-0820
DOI:
10.1080/00455091.1989.10716468
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1989
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2067205-6
detail.hit.zdb_id:
280552-2
SSG:
5,1
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