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The illusory nature of ontological status and its implications for legal, moral and social organisation - RETRACTED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2008

Dr Anthony Amatrudo
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Abstract

This paper sets out the work of Parfit, in terms of Hume and Locke, in terms of the treatment of the person. It considers how ontological status is often a chimerical notion. It sets out the non-bindingness of promises thesis and develops this in terms of intentional action to show how intentional action itself may be impossible. The paper also raises questions about how we define groups, such as criminal groups, in terms of intentionality.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Journal of Law in Context , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 63 - 77
Copyright
Cambridge University Press 2008

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Footnotes

1

Dr Anthony Amatrudo, Programme Leader for Criminology, University of Sunderland, School of Health, Natural and Social Sciences, Priestman Building, Green Terrace, Sunderland, SR1 3PZ, UK. anthony.amatrudo@sunderland.ac.uk

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