In:
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, Aletheia - Associacao Cientifica e Cultural, Vol. 78, No. 3 ( 2022-08-12), p. 771-796
Abstract:
In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe (and translate) it as something like a perception (Wahrnehmung), showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0870-5283
,
2183-461X
DOI:
10.17990/RPF/2022_78_3_0000
DOI:
10.17990/RPF/2022_78_3_0771
Language:
Unknown
Publisher:
Aletheia - Associacao Cientifica e Cultural
Publication Date:
2022
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2560562-8
SSG:
7,36
SSG:
1
SSG:
5,1
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