In:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley, Vol. 107, No. 1 ( 2005-03), p. 175-195
Kurzfassung:
This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of “global” pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non‐cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0347-0520
,
1467-9442
DOI:
10.1111/sjoe.2005.107.issue-1
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00401.x
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Wiley
Publikationsdatum:
2005
ZDB Id:
8170-X
ZDB Id:
1473804-1
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