In:
Advanced Materials Research, Trans Tech Publications, Ltd., Vol. 1092-1093 ( 2015-3), p. 1585-1590
Abstract:
To reduce carbon emission, cap-and-trade (C & T) is regarded as one of the effective environmental regulations around the world, which brings huge challenges to generating firms. In this paper, a tripartite game model on carbon abatement is built to analyze their optimal strategies under the C & T scheme. Based on the equilibrium of the game, some suggestions are presented to give the government agency to promote the efficiency of C & T scheme, that is, introducing carbon verification institution and doing heavier fine to firm will decrease the probability of firm deception and relieve the burden of the government agency; setting reward to carbon verification institution and an appropriate increase in fine of carbon verification institution will decrease the probability of supervisor inspection, further saving supervision costs.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1662-8985
DOI:
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.1092-1093
DOI:
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.1092-1093.1585
Language:
Unknown
Publisher:
Trans Tech Publications, Ltd.
Publication Date:
2015
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2265002-7
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