In:
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley, Vol. 47, No. 1 ( 2009-01), p. 25-53
Abstract:
We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro‐wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0021-9886
,
1468-5965
DOI:
10.1111/jcms.2009.47.issue-1
DOI:
10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01832.x
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2009
detail.hit.zdb_id:
3008-9
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2453487-0
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2249882-5
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1492234-4
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