In:
Axiomathes, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, Vol. 32, No. 4 ( 2022-08), p. 585-604
Kurzfassung:
We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
1122-1151
,
1572-8390
DOI:
10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Publikationsdatum:
2022
ZDB Id:
2064449-8
SSG:
5,1
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