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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) ; 2020
    In:  Management Science Vol. 66, No. 7 ( 2020-07), p. 3211-3233
    In: Management Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Vol. 66, No. 7 ( 2020-07), p. 3211-3233
    Abstract: Rural consumers may face not only the challenge of affordability but also the problem of limited accessibility. Can a government’s subsidy program effectively address these issues? This paper examines the impact of a large-scale subsidy program, “Household electrical appliances going to the countryside,” offered by the Chinese government. The government regulation imposes a price subsidy combined with a price ceiling on products in the program. We consider two effects of the subsidy: the retail price is lowered to make the product more affordable to consumers, and manufacturers are encouraged to expand their distribution coverage to make products more accessible to consumers. We build a dynamic model of oligopoly to study how firms adjust their distribution coverage. Conditional on the model estimates, we evaluate the program’s effects on social welfare, consumer surplus, and firms’ market performance and marketing channel decisions through counterfactual analyses. We find that the subsidy program increases social welfare by CNY 0.209 billion, as a result of a subsidy expense of CNY 0.236 billion. When breaking down the impact, we find it increases consumer surplus by CNY 0.184 billion (50%), manufacturers’ profits by CNY 0.125 billion (53%), and manufacturers’ payoffs by CNY 2.5 million (17%). Specifically, 14% (13.2%) of the consumer surplus (firm profit) increases are from changes in distribution coverage, and the rest is from the subsidy (price changes). The program’s return of investment (i.e., social welfare minus subsidy expense), which is negative, however, could be improved by applying a relatively lower subsidy rate. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0025-1909 , 1526-5501
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
    Publication Date: 2020
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 206345-1
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2023019-9
    SSG: 3,2
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academy of Management ; 1998
    In:  Academy of Management Review Vol. 23, No. 2 ( 1998-04), p. 285-304
    In: Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management, Vol. 23, No. 2 ( 1998-04), p. 285-304
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0363-7425 , 1930-3807
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Academy of Management
    Publication Date: 1998
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2064579-X
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 196768-X
    SSG: 3,2
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Elsevier BV ; 2009
    In:  Ecological Economics Vol. 68, No. 10 ( 2009-8), p. 2706-2712
    In: Ecological Economics, Elsevier BV, Vol. 68, No. 10 ( 2009-8), p. 2706-2712
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0921-8009
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Elsevier BV
    Publication Date: 2009
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1002942-4
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1500316-4
    SSG: 12
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Informa UK Limited ; 2018
    In:  Journal of the American Statistical Association Vol. 113, No. 524 ( 2018-10-02), p. 1601-1611
    In: Journal of the American Statistical Association, Informa UK Limited, Vol. 113, No. 524 ( 2018-10-02), p. 1601-1611
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0162-1459 , 1537-274X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Informa UK Limited
    Publication Date: 2018
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2064981-2
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 207602-0
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    EDP Sciences ; 2021
    In:  RAIRO - Operations Research Vol. 55, No. 2 ( 2021-03), p. 433-456
    In: RAIRO - Operations Research, EDP Sciences, Vol. 55, No. 2 ( 2021-03), p. 433-456
    Abstract: This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier, and discusses the optimal decisions of supply chain participants under decentralized decision-making without and with demand disruption, respectively. By comparing the optimal decisions in the two scenarios, we find that the optimal decision after demand disruption is a linear function of the demand disruption plus optimal decision before demand disruption. Additionally, when the demand disruption is in interval (− ψu 2 , ψu 1 ), the optimal total production of the supply chain is equal before and after demand disruption. Moreover, the profits of the supply chain members and the value of their recognizing demand disruption are largely affected by the scale of demand disruption. Finally, the results show that the improved revenue-sharing contract can effectively improve the supply chain performance.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0399-0559 , 1290-3868
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: EDP Sciences
    Publication Date: 2021
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1468388-X
    SSG: 3,2
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academy of Management ; 2003
    In:  Academy of Management Review Vol. 28, No. 4 ( 2003-10), p. 587-605
    In: Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management, Vol. 28, No. 4 ( 2003-10), p. 587-605
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0363-7425 , 1930-3807
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Academy of Management
    Publication Date: 2003
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2064579-X
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 196768-X
    SSG: 3,2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    SAGE Publications ; 2008
    In:  Journal of Marketing Vol. 72, No. 5 ( 2008-09), p. 15-30
    In: Journal of Marketing, SAGE Publications, Vol. 72, No. 5 ( 2008-09), p. 15-30
    Abstract: Identifying market evolution is a necessary step in persistence analysis of marketing input–output relationships. Using the advertising–sales relationship to represent general marketing input–output dynamics, the authors theoretically distinguish two types of market evolution: (1) intrinsic evolution, in which sales evolve independent of advertising and temporary advertising can generate persistent effects, and (2) induced evolution, in which sales evolution is supported by sustained advertising budgets in an intrinsic-stationary market and there are no real persistent effects of temporary advertising. The proposed intrinsic market evolution test can identify intrinsic-evolving and intrinsic-stationary markets. The authors analyze five major budgeting implications and provide methods to quantify temporary and sustained budgeting. In general, in an intrinsic-evolving market, budgeting can be short-term focused, whereas in an intrinsic-stationary market, the focus should be on sustained budgeting. Percentage budgeting at a sufficient level can create induced evolution. Contrary to conventional wisdom, temporary, intensive advertising campaigns are often not necessary. Empirical illustrations demonstrate the two types of evolutions and the relationships between budgeting methods and sales performance.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0022-2429 , 1547-7185
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: SAGE Publications
    Publication Date: 2008
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2052318-X
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 218318-3
    SSG: 3,2
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academy of Management ; 1998
    In:  The Academy of Management Review Vol. 23, No. 2 ( 1998-04), p. 285-
    In: The Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management, Vol. 23, No. 2 ( 1998-04), p. 285-
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0363-7425
    RVK:
    Language: Unknown
    Publisher: Academy of Management
    Publication Date: 1998
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2064579-X
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 196768-X
    SSG: 3,2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Informa UK Limited ; 2017
    In:  The International Journal of Human Resource Management Vol. 28, No. 12 ( 2017-07-04), p. 1640-1660
    In: The International Journal of Human Resource Management, Informa UK Limited, Vol. 28, No. 12 ( 2017-07-04), p. 1640-1660
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0958-5192 , 1466-4399
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Informa UK Limited
    Publication Date: 2017
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2032106-5
    SSG: 3,2
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) ; 1999
    In:  Management Science Vol. 45, No. 6 ( 1999-06), p. 804-823
    In: Management Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Vol. 45, No. 6 ( 1999-06), p. 804-823
    Abstract: Our study concerns bargaining behavior in situations where one party is in a stronger position than the other. We investigate both the tradeoff the favored party makes between pursuing his strategic advantage and giving weight to other players' concern for fairness, and the tradeoff the disadvantaged player makes between pursuing a fair outcome from a disadvantaged position and the cost of that pursuit. In particular, we hypothesize that the degree to which strategically strong players attempt to exploit their strategic advantage depends on their potential costs for doing so. Similarly, the degree to which weak players persist in seeking “fairness” is also a function of how much it (potentially) costs them to do so. Students negotiated in pairs over the division of $HK50 using a finite horizon, fixed-cost (per rejection) alternating offer rule. Each pair consisted of a high-cost and a low-cost bargainer. In accordance with the hypothesis, the willingness of the high-cost bargainers to demand fairness and to persist in their demands was a function of how much it cost them to do so, and the degree to which the low-cost bargainers attempted to exploit their strategic advantage depended on their own cost of rejection. We conclude that “fairness” has a price such that the higher its price, the lower the “demand” for it. This suggests that demands for fairness are subject to cost-benefit evaluation, are in this sense deliberate, and are well thought out.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0025-1909 , 1526-5501
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
    Publication Date: 1999
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 206345-1
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2023019-9
    SSG: 3,2
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