In:
Management Science, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Vol. 48, No. 12 ( 2002-12), p. 1640-1644
Kurzfassung:
In this note, we identify two errors in Greenleaf, Rao, and Sinha's (1993) analysis of negotiation of guarantees in auctions. This note provides a high-level but self-contained summary of the revised results. We find that, in contrast with the earlier claim, guaranteed auctions lead to greater total expected revenue than conventional auctions. The ability to bargain over guarantee values and commissions certainly benefits sellers but may hurt the profits of auction houses. We relate these results to recent events in auction markets.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0025-1909
,
1526-5501
DOI:
10.1287/mnsc.48.12.1640.441
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Publikationsdatum:
2002
ZDB Id:
206345-1
ZDB Id:
2023019-9
SSG:
3,2
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