GLORIA

GEOMAR Library Ocean Research Information Access

X

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the U.S. states
    SAGE Publications ; 2013
    In:  Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol. 25, No. 3 ( 2013-07), p. 363-387
    Details
    In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, SAGE Publications, Vol. 25, No. 3 ( 2013-07), p. 363-387
    Abstract: Most government bureaucracies in developed countries use civil service systems. What accounts for their adoption? We develop and test a model of bureaucratic reforms under repeated partisan competition. In the model, two political parties composed of overlapping generations of candidates compete for office. Under a spoils system, an incumbent politician can either continue to “politicize” the bureaucracy, which allows her to direct benefits to voters in a way that will increase her electoral prospects, or she can “insulate” the bureaucracy, which prevents all future winners from using the bureaucracy for electoral advantage. Our main result is that politicization persists when incumbents expect to win, and insulation takes place when they expect to lose. We test this hypothesis using data from the adoption of civil service reforms across the U.S. states. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical patterns leading up to the implementation of the general civil service reforms. Using both state and city level data, we observe an increase in partisan competition prior to the reforms.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0951-6298 , 1460-3667
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629812453217
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: English
    Publisher: SAGE Publications
    Publication Date: 2013
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 623169-X
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1481281-2
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions
    JSTOR ; 1994
    In:  American Journal of Political Science Vol. 38, No. 3 ( 1994-08), p. 745-
    Details
    In: American Journal of Political Science, JSTOR, Vol. 38, No. 3 ( 1994-08), p. 745-
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0092-5853
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/2111605
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: Unknown
    Publisher: JSTOR
    Publication Date: 1994
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010010-3
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 280044-5
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
    JSTOR ; 2002
    In:  American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46, No. 1 ( 2002-01), p. 90-
    Details
    In: American Journal of Political Science, JSTOR, Vol. 46, No. 1 ( 2002-01), p. 90-
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0092-5853
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/3088416
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: Unknown
    Publisher: JSTOR
    Publication Date: 2002
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010010-3
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 280044-5
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Buying Supermajorities
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1996
    In:  American Political Science Review Vol. 90, No. 2 ( 1996-06), p. 303-315
    Details
    In: American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 90, No. 2 ( 1996-06), p. 303-315
    Abstract: Minimal winning coalitions have appeared as a key prediction or as an essential assumption of virtually all formal models of coalition formation, vote buying, and logrolling. Notwithstanding this research, we provide a model showing that supermajority coalitions may be cheaper than minimal winning coalitions. Specifically, if vote buyers move sequentially, and if the losing vote buyer is always granted a last chance to attack the winner's coalition, then minimal winning coalitions will generally not be cheapest, and equilibrium coalitions will generally not be minimal winning. We provide results relating equilibrium coalition size with preferences of the legislators and vote buyers, and we show that minimal winning coalitions should occur in only rare cases. We discuss these results in light of empirical work on coalition size and suggest other possible avenues for testing our model.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0003-0554 , 1537-5943
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/2082886
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1996
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010035-8
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 123621-0
    SSG: 7,26
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2001
    In:  American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 3 ( 2001-09), p. 689-698
    Details
    In: American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 95, No. 3 ( 2001-09), p. 689-698
    Abstract: Contrary to the claims of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, our method does not estimate the ideal points of moderates significantly less accurately than the ideal points of extremists. This is true for at least two reasons: (1) there is significant randomness in voting; as a consequence, on a lopsided vote moderates often vote with the extremists; and (2) our data set includes some roll calls that require a supermajority for passage; for these we define a 50%–50% roll call as lopsided. We also show that the classification-success method of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal severely understates the presence of party influence. Furthermore, we show that a proper interpretation of some of their results reveals a significant amount of party influence in Congress.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0003-0554 , 1537-5943
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1017/S0003055401003070
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2001
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010035-8
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 123621-0
    SSG: 7,26
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2000
    In:  American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 3 ( 2000-09-01), p. 683-684
    Details
    In: American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 94, No. 3 ( 2000-09-01), p. 683-684
    Abstract: In a recent paper, Banks (2000), adopting the framework of our model (Groseclose and Snyder 1996), derives several new and noteworthy results. In addition, he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4. Here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption: In equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition, that is, she does not bribe every member of her coalition. We conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of Banks's proposition 1; we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote-buying game.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0003-0554 , 1537-5943
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/2585840
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2000
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010035-8
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 123621-0
    SSG: 7,26
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Gatekeeping or Not, Sample Selection in the Roll Call Agenda Matters
    JSTOR ; 1992
    In:  American Journal of Political Science Vol. 36, No. 1 ( 1992-02), p. 36-
    Details
    In: American Journal of Political Science, JSTOR, Vol. 36, No. 1 ( 1992-02), p. 36-
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0092-5853
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/2111423
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: Unknown
    Publisher: JSTOR
    Publication Date: 1992
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010010-3
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 280044-5
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage
    JSTOR ; 2000
    In:  American Journal of Political Science Vol. 44, No. 1 ( 2000-01), p. 17-
    Details
    In: American Journal of Political Science, JSTOR, Vol. 44, No. 1 ( 2000-01), p. 17-
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0092-5853
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/2669290
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: Unknown
    Publisher: JSTOR
    Publication Date: 2000
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010010-3
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 280044-5
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes
    JSTOR ; 1992
    In:  American Journal of Political Science Vol. 36, No. 1 ( 1992-02), p. 1-
    Details
    In: American Journal of Political Science, JSTOR, Vol. 36, No. 1 ( 1992-02), p. 1-
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0092-5853
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.2307/2111421
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: Unknown
    Publisher: JSTOR
    Publication Date: 1992
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2010010-3
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 280044-5
    SSG: 3,6
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Television and the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections
    Wiley ; 2006
    In:  Legislative Studies Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 4 ( 2006-11), p. 469-490
    Details
    In: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Wiley, Vol. 31, No. 4 ( 2006-11), p. 469-490
    Abstract: We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study the relationship between television and electoral competition. In particular, we compare incumbent vote margins in media markets where content originates in the same state as media consumers versus vote margins where content originates out of state. This contrast provides a clear test of whether or not television coverage correlates with the incumbency advantage. We study U.S. Senate and state gubernatorial races from the 1950s through the 1990s and find that the effect of TV is small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0362-9805 , 1939-9162
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.3162/036298006X201896
    RVK:
    MA 1000
    Language: English
    Publisher: Wiley
    Publication Date: 2006
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2097754-2
    SSG: 2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...