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  • Philosophie  (8)
  • 1
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    This paper might change your mind
    Wiley ; 2021
    In:  Noûs Vol. 55, No. 4 ( 2021-12), p. 863-890
    Details
    In: Noûs, Wiley, Vol. 55, No. 4 ( 2021-12), p. 863-890
    Kurzfassung: Linguistic intervention in rational decision making is standardly captured in terms of information change. But the standard view gives us no way to model interventions involving expressions that only have an attentional effects on conversational contexts. How are expressions with non‐informational content – like epistemic modals – used to intervene in rational decision making? We show how to model rational decision change without information change: replace a standard conception of value (on which the value of a set of worlds reduces to values of individual worlds in the set) with one on which the value of a set of worlds is determined by a selection function that picks out a generic member world. We discuss some upshots of this view for theorizing in philosophy and formal semantics.
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0029-4624 , 1468-0068
    URL: Issue
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1111/nous.v55.4
    DOI: 10.1111/nous.12336
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Wiley
    Publikationsdatum: 2021
    ZDB Id: 1482826-1
    ZDB Id: 2010839-4
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Genericity and Inductive Inference
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2023
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 90, No. 3 ( 2023-07), p. 539-557
    Details
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 90, No. 3 ( 2023-07), p. 539-557
    Kurzfassung: We are often justified in acting on the basis of evidential confirmation. I argue that this is because inductive inference supports belief in non-quantificational—or generic —generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of inductive inference. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of a reasoning instinct that is typically (but not always) correct, and allows us to approximate the predictions that formal epistemology would make.
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1017/psa.2022.94
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    AK 10100
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publikationsdatum: 2023
    ZDB Id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Illocutionary harm
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC ; 2021
    In:  Philosophical Studies Vol. 178, No. 5 ( 2021-05), p. 1631-1646
    Details
    In: Philosophical Studies, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, Vol. 178, No. 5 ( 2021-05), p. 1631-1646
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0031-8116 , 1573-0883
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1007/s11098-020-01504-0
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    CB 4300
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    Publikationsdatum: 2021
    ZDB Id: 2008947-8
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 4
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Phenomenal dispositions
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC ; 2020
    In:  Synthese Vol. 197, No. 9 ( 2020-09), p. 3969-3980
    Details
    In: Synthese, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, Vol. 197, No. 9 ( 2020-09), p. 3969-3980
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0039-7857 , 1573-0964
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-01909-9
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    Publikationsdatum: 2020
    ZDB Id: 204075-X
    ZDB Id: 2012638-4
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 5,1
    SSG: 5,2
    SSG: 7,11
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Pragmatic Particularism
    Wiley ; 2022
    In:  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 105, No. 1 ( 2022-07), p. 62-78
    Details
    In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Wiley, Vol. 105, No. 1 ( 2022-07), p. 62-78
    Kurzfassung: For the Intentionalist , utterance content is wholly determined by a speaker’s meaning‐intentions; the sentence uttered serves merely to facilitate the audience’s recovering these intentions. We argue that Intentionalists ought to be Particularists , holding that the only “principles” of meaning recovery needed are those governing inferences to the best explanation; “principles” that are both defeasible and, in a sense to be elaborated, variable . We discuss some ways in which some theorists have erred in trying to tame the “wild west” of pragmatics and context‐sensitivity – including recent work that makes essential appeal to the information structure of a discourse – and in so doing, offer a general recipe for defending the Particularist picture of utterance content and its recovery that we favor.
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0031-8205 , 1933-1592
    URL: Issue
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1111/phpr.v105.1
    DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12801
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    RVK:
    CB 3500
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Wiley
    Publikationsdatum: 2022
    ZDB Id: 208823-X
    ZDB Id: 2008885-1
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 6
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Acts of desire
    Informa UK Limited ; 2021
    In:  Inquiry Vol. 64, No. 9 ( 2021-10-21), p. 955-972
    Details
    In: Inquiry, Informa UK Limited, Vol. 64, No. 9 ( 2021-10-21), p. 955-972
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0020-174X , 1502-3923
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1667864
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Informa UK Limited
    Publikationsdatum: 2021
    ZDB Id: 1492782-2
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 7
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Is that a Threat?
    Springer Science and Business Media LLC ; 2021
    In:  Erkenntnis Vol. 86, No. 5 ( 2021-10), p. 1161-1183
    Details
    In: Erkenntnis, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, Vol. 86, No. 5 ( 2021-10), p. 1161-1183
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0165-0106 , 1572-8420
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1007/s10670-019-00148-9
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
    Publikationsdatum: 2021
    ZDB Id: 2015303-X
    ZDB Id: 203461-X
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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    Online-Ressource
  • 8
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Acquaintance and first-person attitude reports
    Oxford University Press (OUP) ; 2019
    In:  Analysis Vol. 79, No. 2 ( 2019-04-01), p. 251-259
    Details
    In: Analysis, Oxford University Press (OUP), Vol. 79, No. 2 ( 2019-04-01), p. 251-259
    Materialart: Online-Ressource
    ISSN: 0003-2638 , 1467-8284
    URL: Article
    DOI: 10.1093/analys/any054
    RVK:
    CA 1000
    Sprache: Englisch
    Verlag: Oxford University Press (OUP)
    Publikationsdatum: 2019
    ZDB Id: 1481042-6
    SSG: 5,1
    Standort Signatur Einschränkungen Verfügbarkeit
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