In:
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 1994, No. 1 ( 1994), p. 260-269
Abstract:
“Maximizing expected utility (MEU)” is one assumption of (strict)
Bayesian decision theory [Savage 1972] . According to the principle of MEU,
in a given decision situation, the decision maker should choose one of the alternatives with maximal expected utility [For an excellent discussion of
decision theory, see Jeffrey 1990] . However, MEU as the foundation of
Bayesian decision theory has been under attack. One counterexample that seems to dispute MEU as a rationality principle is offered by Daniel
Ellsberg[Ellsberg 1961] . While discussing what has been dubbed as the
Ellsberg paradox, I will consider briefly three decision principles, each of which is different from the MEU principle.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0270-8647
,
2327-9486
DOI:
10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193031
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1994
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2082673-4
SSG:
11
SSG:
5,1
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