Note: cover -- In Defense of the Human Being -- Copyright -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: A Humanism of Embodiment -- Acknowledgments -- References -- A. Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, Virtuality -- 1 Human and Artificial Intelligence: A Clarification -- Introduction: The World of Data -- The Digitization of the World -- Subjectivity and Its Simulation -- Persons are Not Programs -- Programs are Not Persons -- Robots, Androids, and Artificial Life (AL) -- Conclusion: Simulation and Original -- References -- 2 Beyond the Human? A Critique of Transhumanism -- Introduction: Between Naturalism and Culturalism -- The Idea of Perfectibility -- Can Human Nature be Improved? -- Cognitive Skills -- Happiness and Morality -- Aging and Death -- The Contradictions of Posthumanism -- Mind Uploading or Transfer of Consciousness -- Critique of Functionalism -- Critique of Neuro-​Reductionism -- Transhumanism as Neo-​Gnosticism -- Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Virtual Other: Empathy in the Age of Virtuality -- Introduction -- Empathy and Virtual Reality -- Primary, Implicit, or Intercorporeal Empathy -- Extended, Explicit or Imaginative Empathy -- Fictional Empathy -- Interim Summary -- Virtualization in the Present -- Phantomization -- Disembodied Communication -- Summary and Conclusion -- References -- B. Brain, Person, and Reality -- 4 Person and Brain: Against Cerebrocentrism -- Introduction -- Critique of the Cerebral Subject -- Subjectivity and Intentionality -- Embodiment -- Interpersonality -- Critique of Localizationism -- Critique of Neuroimaging -- Holism of Consciousness -- Personhood as Embodied Subjectivity -- Brain, Body, and Environment -- Brain Transplantation -- Conclusion -- References -- 5 Embodied Freedom: A Libertarian Position -- Introduction -- Can Brains make Decisions? -- Freedom as a Personal Ability. , Embodied Freedom -- External Objections -- The Compatibilist Counter Position -- Immanent Objections -- Conclusion -- References -- 6 Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism -- Introduction -- Bodily Being-​in-​the-​World: The Coextension of Lived Body  and Physical Body -- The Locus of Pain -- Conclusion: Life-​World and Neuroscience -- References -- 7 Perception and Reality: Sketch of an Interactive Realism -- Introduction -- Perception as Interaction -- The Objectifying Power of Perception -- The Implicit Intersubjectivity of Perception -- Genesis of Intersubjective Perception -- Subjectivation of Perception in Schizophrenia -- Summary -- References -- C. Psychiatry and Society -- 8 Psychiatry between Psyche and Brain -- Introduction -- Reductionist Assumptions and their Verification -- Psychiatry as Relational Medicine: An Integrative Concept -- Conclusion -- References -- 9 Embodiment and Personal Identity in Dementia -- Introduction -- Personal Identity -- Body Memory -- Dementia and Personal Identity -- Dementia as a Loss of Reflexivity and Meta-​Perspective -- Body Memory in Dementia -- Relational versus Embodied View of the Person in Dementia -- Conclusion -- References -- 10 The Cyclical Time of the Body and the Linear Time of Modernity -- Introduction -- The Processes of Life and their Cyclical Time -- The Cyclical Structure of Body Memory -- Cyclical and Linear Time -- Individual and Collective Formation of the Linear Order of Time -- Conflicts between Cyclical and Linear Orders of Time -- Conclusion -- References -- Text References (English papers) -- Index.

Note: Cover -- Halt-title -- Ecology of the Brain -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part 1 Criticism of neurobiological reductionism -- 1 Cosmos in the head? -- 1.1 The idealistic legacy of brain research -- 1.2 First criticism: embodied perception -- 1.2.1 Perception and motion -- 1.2.2 The coextension of lived body and physical -- 1.3 Second criticism: the objectivity of the phenomenal world -- 1.3.1 The space of perception -- 1.3.2 The objectivizing achievement of perception -- 1.4 Third criticism: the reality of colors -- 1.5 Summary -- 2 The brain as the subject's heir? -- 2.1 First criticism: the irreducibility of subjectivity -- 2.1.1 Phenomenal consciousnes -- 2.1.2 Intentionality -- 2.1.2.1 Intentionality and phenomenal consciousness -- 2.1.2.2 Intentionality and representation -- 2.2 Second criticism: category mistakes -- 2.2.1 The mereological fallacy -- 2.2.2 The localization fallacy -- 2.3 Third criticism: the powerless subject? -- 2.3.1 The unity of action -- 2.3.2 The role of consciousness -- 2.4 Summary: the primacy of the lifeworld -- Part 2 Body, person, and the brain -- 3 Foundations: Subjectivity and life -- 3.1 Embodied subjectivity -- 3.1.1 The body as subject -- 3.1.2 The dual aspect of subjective and physical body -- 3.1.3 The dual aspect of life -- 3.2 Ecological and enactive biology -- 3.2.1 Self-organisation and autonomy -- 3.2.2 Dependency and exchange between organism and environment -- 3.2.3 Subjectivity -- 3.2.4 Summary -- 3.3 The circular and integral causality of living beings -- 3.3.1 Vertical circular causality -- 3.3.2 Horizontal circular causality -- 3.3.3 Integral causality and its basis in capacities -- 3.3.4 Th e formation of capacities through body memory -- 3.3.5 Summary -- 4 The brain as an organ of the living being -- 4.1 The brain in the context of the organism. , 4.1.1 The inner milieu -- 4.1.2 The feeling of being alive -- 4.1.3 Higher levels of consciousness -- 4.1.4 Embodied aff ectivity -- 4.1.5 Summary -- 4.2 The unity of brain, organism and environment -- 4.2.1 Linear versus circular organism-environment-relations -- 4.2.2 Consciousness as integral -- 4.2.3 Neuroplasticity and the incorporation of experience -- 4.2.4 Transformation and transparency: the brain as resonance organ -- 4.2.5 Information, representation and resonance -- 4.2.5.1 Information -- 4.2.5.2 Representation -- 4.2.5.3 Patterns and resonance -- 4.2.6 Conclusion: mediated immediacy -- 5 The brain as an organ of the person -- 5.1 Primary intersubjectivity -- 5.1.1 Prenatal development -- 5.1.2 Intercorporeality and interaff ectivity -- 5.1.3 Intercorporeal memory -- 5.2 Neurobiological foundations -- 5.2.1 The attachment system -- 5.2.2 The social resonance system ("mirror neurons") -- 5.2.2.1 Foundations -- 5.2.2.2 Simulation or resonance? -- 5.3 Secondary intersubjectivity -- 5.3.1 The 9-month revolution -- 5.3.2 The embodied development of language -- 5.3.2.1 Language as social practice -- 5.3.2.2 Neurobiological foundations -- 5.3.3 Outlook: language, thought, and perspective- taking -- 5.4 Summary: brain and culture -- 6 The concept of dual aspectivity -- 6.1 The mental, the physical, and the living -- 6.2 Differentiation from identity theories -- 6.3 Emergence -- 6.3.1 The primacy of function -- 6.3.2 Downward causality and dual aspectivity -- 6.4 Consequences for psychophysical relations -- 6.4.1 Intentional and psychological determination of physiological processes -- 6.4.2 Embodied freedom -- 6.4.2.1 A phenomenology of decision-making -- 6.4.2.2 Free will and integral causality -- 6.4.3 "Psychosomatic" and "somatopsychic" interrelations -- 6.5 Summary -- 7 Implications for psychiatry and psychological medicine. , 7.1 Neurobiological reductionism in psychiatry -- 7.2 Mental disorders as circular processes -- 7.2.1 Vertical circularity -- 7.2.2 Horizontal circularity -- 7.2.3 Synopsis -- 7.3 Circular causality in pathogenesis -- 7.3.1 Etiology of depression -- 7.3.2 The development of vulnerability -- 7.3.3 Summary -- 7.4 Circular processes in therapy -- 7.4.1 Somatic therapy -- 7.4.2 Psychotherapy -- 7.4.3 Comparison of therapeutic approaches -- 7.5 Summary: the role of subjectivity -- 8 Conclusion -- 8.1 Brain and person -- 8.2 The scope of neurobiological research -- 8.3 Naturalistic versus personalistic concept of the human being -- References -- Index.