In:
Advanced Materials Research, Trans Tech Publications, Ltd., Vol. 250-253 ( 2011-5), p. 2440-2445
Abstract:
Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1662-8985
DOI:
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253
DOI:
10.4028/www.scientific.net/AMR.250-253.2440
Language:
Unknown
Publisher:
Trans Tech Publications, Ltd.
Publication Date:
2011
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2265002-7
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