In:
The Computer Journal, Oxford University Press (OUP), Vol. 62, No. 8 ( 2019-08-09), p. 1232-1245
Abstract:
In PKC 2000, Pointcheval presented a generic technique to make a highly secure cryptosystem from any partially trapdoor one-way function in the random oracle model. More precisely, any suitable problem providing a one-way cryptosystem can be efficiently derived into a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme. In fact, the overhead only consists of two hashing and a XOR. In this paper, we consider the key-dependent message (KDM) security of the Pointcheval’s transformation. Unfortunately, we do not know how to directly prove its KDM-CCA security because there are some details in the proof that we can not bypass. However, a slight modification of the original transformation (we call twisted Pointcheval’s scheme) makes it possible to obtain the KDM-CCA security. As a result, we prove that the twisted Pointcheval’s scheme achieves the KDM-CCA security without introducing any new assumption. That is, we can construct a KDM-CCA secure PKE scheme from partial trapdoor one-way injective family in the random oracle model.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0010-4620
,
1460-2067
DOI:
10.1093/comjnl/bxz044
Language:
English
Publisher:
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Publication Date:
2019
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1477172-X
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