In:
Acta Sociologica, SAGE Publications, Vol. 15, No. 4 ( 1972-10), p. 366-370
Abstract:
Societal-level problems often result from many individuals acting in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the group. This paper describes an experimental game based on continued degradation of the central resource which determines each player's winnings; players elect to allow, to not allow, or to reverse the degradation by spending from their respective scores. The game was begun with either a "pure" or half-degraded central resource and was played with subjects winning amounts based on their personal scores or on the group's combined score. Results under all conditions are examined
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0001-6993
,
1502-3869
DOI:
10.1177/000169937201500404
Language:
English
Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Publication Date:
1972
detail.hit.zdb_id:
7183-3
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1463377-2
SSG:
3,4
SSG:
7,22
Permalink
