In:
Dialogue, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 29, No. 3 ( 1990), p. 323-334
Abstract:
According to the received view of scientific theories, a scientific theory is an axiomatic-deductive linguistic structure which must include some set of guidelines (“correspondence rules”) for interpreting its theoretical terms with reference to the world of observable phenomena. According to the semantic view, a scientific theory need not be formulated as an axiomatic-deductive structure with correspondence rules, but need only specify models which are said to be “isomorphic” with actual phenomenal systems. In this paper, I consider both the received and semantic views as they bear on the issue of how a theory relates to the world (Section 1). Then I offer a critique of some arguments frequently put forth in support of the semantic view (Section 2). Finally, I suggest a more convincing “meta-methodological” argument (based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan) in favour of the semantic view (Section 3).
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0012-2173
,
1759-0949
DOI:
10.1017/S001221730001310X
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1990
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2043720-1
SSG:
5,1
Permalink