In:
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 84, No. 1 ( 1990-03), p. 243-245
Abstract:
In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction .
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0003-0554
,
1537-5943
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1990
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2010035-8
detail.hit.zdb_id:
123621-0
SSG:
7,26
SSG:
3,6
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