In:
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 22, No. 5 ( 1999-10), p. 840-841
Abstract:
The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions
of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear
on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0140-525X
,
1469-1825
DOI:
10.1017/S0140525X99342199
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1999
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1481789-5
detail.hit.zdb_id:
423721-3
SSG:
7,11
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