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  • 2010-2014  (4)
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  • 2010-2014  (4)
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Pennsylvania State University Press ; 2010
    In:  Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research Vol. 2, No. 1 ( 2010-01-01), p. 25-38
    In: Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Vol. 2, No. 1 ( 2010-01-01), p. 25-38
    Abstract: This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identify large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple tiers of enforcement and the incentives facing enforcement officers, and conflict between protected area managers and rural people's needs.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1939-0459 , 1939-0467
    Language: English
    Publisher: The Pennsylvania State University Press
    Publication Date: 2010
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Pennsylvania State University Press ; 2012
    In:  Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research Vol. 4, No. 3 ( 2012-07-01), p. 209-213
    In: Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Vol. 4, No. 3 ( 2012-07-01), p. 209-213
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1939-0459 , 1939-0467
    Language: English
    Publisher: The Pennsylvania State University Press
    Publication Date: 2012
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Wiley ; 2013
    In:  Natural Resources Forum Vol. 37, No. 3 ( 2013-08), p. 141-152
    In: Natural Resources Forum, Wiley, Vol. 37, No. 3 ( 2013-08), p. 141-152
    Abstract: REDD (reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation) aims to slow carbon releases caused by forest disturbance by making payments conditional on forest quality over time. Like earlier policies to slow deforestation, REDD must change the behaviour of forest degrading actors. Broadly, it can be implemented with payments to forest users in exchange for improved forest management, thus creating incentives; through payments for enforcement, thus creating disincentives; or through addressing external drivers such as urban charcoal demand. In T anzania, community‐based forest management ( CBFM ), a form of participatory forest management, was chosen by the T anzania F orest C onservation G roup, a local NGO , as a model for implementing REDD pilot programmes. Payments are made to villages that have the rights to forest carbon. In exchange, the villages must demonstrably reduce deforestation at the village level. In this paper, using this pilot programme as a case study, combined with a review of the literature, we provide insights for REDD implementation in sub‐ S aharan Africa. We pay particular attention to leakage, monitoring and enforcement. We suggest that implementing REDD through CBFM ‐type structures can create appropriate incentives and behaviour change when the recipients of the REDD funds are also the key drivers of forest change. When external forces drive forest change, however, REDD through CBFM ‐type structures becomes an enforcement programme with local communities rather than government agencies being responsible for the enforcement. That structure imposes costs on local communities, whose local authority limits the ability to address leakage outside the particular REDD village.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0165-0203 , 1477-8947
    URL: Issue
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Wiley
    Publication Date: 2013
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2018079-2
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 752464-X
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2012
    In:  Environment and Development Economics Vol. 17, No. 1 ( 2012-02), p. 1-20
    In: Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 17, No. 1 ( 2012-02), p. 1-20
    Abstract: Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1355-770X , 1469-4395
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2012
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1501045-4
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