Description: While in the familiar problem of optimal commodity taxation the government faces a constraint on tax revenue, we consider the case of a consumption target on a group of commodities (i.e.,a weak constraint on total consumption), instead. This optimal commodity tax problem with a consumption target brings about taxation rules that are mainly at variance with the standard results of commodity taxation. In our main theorem, we derive a general, though quite simple, rule of optimal commodity taxation under a target on total consumption: in particular, we establish that higher consumer prices should be charged for commodities with (1) high price elasticities of total demand and (2) low consumption shares in total demand. From this theorem we deduce three important corollaries: an anti-inverse elasticity result, an anti-Corlett– Hague result and a uniform-pricing result. All of these results are (generically) at variance with well-known rules of commodity taxation.

Description: We examine the effect of simultaneous price changes on the total demand for a group of goods, which we call a compound commodity. Specifically, we consider unit and proportional cost components (e.g., taxes, transportation costs) imposed on compound commodities. If the unit cost is positive, the proportional cost raises the relative price of the more expensive good and thus induces substitution towards the less expensive good within this group. Then, the substitution effect of the proportional cost for a compound commodity is non‐negative if and only if the compound commodity and the other goods are ‘on average’ not strongly substitutable.

Description: In many spatial resource models, it is assumed that an agent is able to harvest the resource over the complete spatial domain. However, agents frequently only have access to a resource at particular locations at which a moving biomass, such as fish or game, may be caught or hunted. Here, we analyze an infinite time‐horizon optimal control problem with boundary harvesting and (systems of) parabolic partial differential equations as state dynamics. We formally derive the associated canonical system, consisting of a forward–backward diffusion system with boundary controls, and numerically compute the canonical steady states and the optimal time‐dependent paths, and their dependence on parameters. We start with some one‐species fishing models, and then extend the analysis to a predator–prey model of the Lotka–Volterra type. The models are rather generic, and our methods are quite general, and thus should be applicable to large classes of structurally similar bioeconomic problems with boundary controls. Recommedations for Resource Managers Just like ordinary differential equation‐constrained (optimal) control problems and distributed partial differential equation (PDE) constrained control problems, boundary control problems with PDE state dynamics may be formally treated by the Pontryagin's maximum principle or canonical system formalism (state and adjoint PDEs). These problems may have multiple (locally) optimal solutions; a first overview of suitable choices can be obtained by identifying canonical steady states. The computation of canonical paths toward some optimal steady state yields temporal information about the optimal harvesting, possibly including waiting time behavior for the stock to recover from a low‐stock initial state, and nonmonotonic (in time) harvesting efforts. Multispecies fishery models may lead to asymmetric effects; for instance, it may be optimal to capture a predator species to protect the prey, even for high costs and low market values of the predators.

Description: We consider an optimal commodity taxation problem under a consumption target and prove the existence of an optimal solution for the problem. This optimal solution obeys taxation rules that are contrary to standard taxation rules such as the inverse-elasticity rule. We also verify the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal solution to exhibit uniform pricing.

Description: This paper contributes to the analysis of centralised versus decentralised labour market negotiations. Applying the familiar Nash bargaining solution, we show that centralised negotiations lead to a lower employment level but to a higher wage rate than decentralised labour market bargaining. While this is an important theoretical result on its own, it has important effects for both empirical labour market research and labour market policies. Also, this result counters the critique that efficient negotiations result in employment levels exceeding the competitive level.