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  • 2015-2019  (4)
  • Economics  (4)
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  • 2015-2019  (4)
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  • Economics  (4)
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd ; 2017
    In:  The International Journal of Accounting Vol. 52, No. 2 ( 2017-06), p. 142-177
    In: The International Journal of Accounting, World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd, Vol. 52, No. 2 ( 2017-06), p. 142-177
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0020-7063
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd
    Publication Date: 2017
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2002289-X
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 411149-7
    SSG: 3,2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Wiley ; 2018
    In:  Production and Operations Management Vol. 27, No. 4 ( 2018-04), p. 605-623
    In: Production and Operations Management, Wiley, Vol. 27, No. 4 ( 2018-04), p. 605-623
    Abstract: With the rise of the Internet economy, an increasing number of firms are offering their core products through online platforms, but retail add‐ons directly to consumers. Meanwhile, many online platforms have also started adopting the agency (model) contract, where the upstream firms decide the retail prices of products while the downstream platforms take a predetermined cut from each sale. This study examines the interaction between an upstream firm's add‐on strategy and a downstream online platform's distribution contract choice. We find that such a firm prefers bundling the add‐on and the core product together under the wholesale contract, but prefers retailing the add‐on separately under the agency contract. Our research thus is the first to suggest that the distribution contract can critically affect a firm's choice between add‐on pricing and bundling. On the platform side, we show that a higher commission rate does not always result in a higher profit for the platform under the agency contract. We further identify two conditions under which the platform prefers the agency contract over the wholesale contract: The commission rate for the platform cannot be too low, and the market potential of the add‐on cannot be too large. For the overall channel, we show that the interaction between add‐on pricing and distribution contracts leads to sub‐optimal channel performance. That said, it is possible for both the firm and the platform to obtain higher profits under the agency contract than under the wholesale contract. Finally, we also demonstrate the robustness of our findings under several alternative model specifications.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1059-1478 , 1937-5956
    URL: Issue
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Wiley
    Publication Date: 2018
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2151364-8
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1108460-1
    SSG: 3,2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Informa UK Limited ; 2017
    In:  Journal of Simulation Vol. 11, No. 3 ( 2017-08), p. 194-207
    In: Journal of Simulation, Informa UK Limited, Vol. 11, No. 3 ( 2017-08), p. 194-207
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1747-7778 , 1747-7786
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Informa UK Limited
    Publication Date: 2017
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2266085-9
    SSG: 3,2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    SAGE Publications ; 2017
    In:  Production and Operations Management Vol. 26, No. 11 ( 2017-11), p. 1971-1988
    In: Production and Operations Management, SAGE Publications, Vol. 26, No. 11 ( 2017-11), p. 1971-1988
    Abstract: Service level agreements (SLAs) are widely adopted performance‐based contracts in operations management practice, and fill rate is the most common performance metric among all the measurements in SLAs. Traditional procedures characterizing the order‐up‐to level satisfying a specified fill rate implicitly assume an infinite performance review horizon. However, in practice, inventory managers are liable to maintain and report fill rates over a finite performance review horizon. This horizon discrepancy leads to deviation between the target fill rate and actual achieved fill rate. In this study, we first examine the behavior of the fill rate distribution over a finite horizon with positive lead time. We analytically prove that the expected fill rate assuming an infinite performance review horizon exceeds the expected fill rate assuming a finite performance review horizon, implying that there exists some inventory “waste” (i.e., overstocking) when the traditional procedure is used. Based on this observation and the complexity of the problem, we propose a simulation‐based algorithm to reduce excess inventory while maintaining the contractual target fill rate. When the lead time is significant relative to the length of the contract horizon, we show that the improvement in the inventory system can be over 5%. Further, we extend our basic setting to incorporate the penalty for failing to meet a target, and show how one can solve large‐scale problems via stochastic approximation. The primary managerial implication of our study is that ignoring the performance review horizon in an SLA will cause overstocking, especially when the lead time is large.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 1059-1478 , 1937-5956
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: SAGE Publications
    Publication Date: 2017
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2151364-8
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1108460-1
    SSG: 3,2
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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