In:
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Vol. 20, No. 1 ( 2018-02), p. 70-84
Abstract:
Two innovative financing schemes have emerged in recent years to enable suppliers to obtain financing for production. The first, purchase order financing (POF), allows financial institutions to offer loans to suppliers by considering the value of purchase orders issued by reputable buyers. Under the second, which we call buyer direct financing (BDF), manufacturers issue both sourcing contracts and loans directly to suppliers. Both schemes are closely related to the supplier’s performance risk (whether the supplier can deliver the order successfully), upon which the repayment of these loans hinges. To understand the relative efficiency of the two emerging schemes, we analyze a game-theoretical model that captures the interactions among three parties (a manufacturer, a financially constrained supplier who can exert unobservable effort to improve delivery reliability, and a bank). We find that, when the manufacturer and the bank have symmetric information, POF and BDF yield the same payoffs for all parties irrespective of the manufacturer’s control advantage under BDF. The manufacturer, however, has more flexibility under BDF in selecting contract terms. In addition, even when the manufacturer has superior information about the supplier’s operational capability, the manufacturer can efficiently signal her private information via the sourcing contract if the supplier’s asset level is not too low. As such, POF remains an attractive financing option. However, if the supplier is severely financially constrained, the manufacturer’s information advantage makes BDF the preferred financing scheme when contracting with an efficient supplier. In particular, the relative benefit of BDF (over POF) is more pronounced when the supply market contains a larger proportion of inefficient suppliers, when differences in efficiency between suppliers are greater, or when the manufacturer’s alternative sourcing option is more expensive. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0638 . This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Issue on Interface of Finance, Operations, and Risk Management.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1523-4614
,
1526-5498
DOI:
10.1287/msom.2017.0638
Language:
English
Publisher:
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Publication Date:
2018
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2023273-1
SSG:
3,2
Permalink
