In:
IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering, IOP Publishing, Vol. 612, No. 5 ( 2019-10-01), p. 052045-
Abstract:
Cloud computing is an Internet-based computing and network model, which provides a market for sharing computing and storage resources. To motivate the cloud providers, the allocation of resources and their pricing becomes one of the challenges in this market. In this situation, designing auction-based mechanisms for cloud resource allocation have attracted a wide interest. Most of prior works focus on designing strategy-proof (a.k.a. truthful) cloud auction mechanisms to eliminate market manipulation. Strategy-proof auctions ensure that no bidders can improve their utilities by untruthful bidding. However, these strategy-proof auctions are fragile when false-name-bids are allowed. This is a new type of cheating where a bidder can gain profit by submitting bids using multiple fictitious names, and it is easy to form in cloud environment. Therefore, a new series of auction mechanisms are needed to guarantee the false-name-proofness. To tackle this issue, in this paper, we designed CACC, a combinatorial auction for resource allocation in Cloud Computing. To address the heterogeneity of cloud resource, the combinatorial auction model is adopted. We show CACC is both strategy-proof and false-name-proof. Moreover, CACC is computationally efficient. Through simulation experiments, we show that CACC is effective and efficient.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1757-8981
,
1757-899X
DOI:
10.1088/1757-899X/612/5/052045
Language:
Unknown
Publisher:
IOP Publishing
Publication Date:
2019
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2506501-4
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