In:
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Wiley, Vol. 64, No. 5 ( 2017-11), p. 467-482
Abstract:
In a two‐period standard law‐enforcement model, individuals observe or break the law. In addition, individuals may offend accidentally. When sanctions are limited by individual wealth constraints, the government chooses appropriate sanctions for first and repeat offenders and the level of monitoring. We assume a welfare‐oriented government and derive subgame‐perfect equilibria for constant, increasing and decreasing sanctions depending on the individual wealth level.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0036-9292
,
1467-9485
DOI:
10.1111/sjpe.2017.64.issue-5
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2017
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1473829-6
detail.hit.zdb_id:
219222-6
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