In:
Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 13, No. 1 ( 2018-01), p. 99-111
Abstract:
Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that cannot be explained by these standard social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game (DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se , our results suggest that prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1930-2975
DOI:
10.1017/S1930297500008858
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
2018
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2316185-1
Permalink