Abstract: Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are a recent socio-technical innovation that seeks to disrupt the existing monetary system. Through mundane uses of this new digital cash, they provide a social critique of the centralized infrastructures of the banking industry. This paper outlines an ethnographic research agenda for this new digital frontier of social practice and exchange and the human affordances of engaging with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Firstly we argue that the use of Bitcoin can be seen as acts of social resistance and a form of social mobility that harnesses the emergent, serendipitous and dynamic properties of digital community. We then outline the disruptive nature of borderless, affordable and instantaneous international transfers within social practice. Finally, we identify the possible permutations of trust that may be found in the technical affordances of Bitcoin and how these relate to user (pseudo)anonymity, cybertheft, cyberfraud, and consumer protection. Bringing together these three key areas we highlight the importance of understanding the ordinary (rather than extra-ordinary) uses of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. We contend that focusing upon users interactions with Bitcoin as a system and culture will shed light upon mundane acts of socio-technical disruption, acts that critique and provide alternative financial exchange practices to the economic and regulatory financial infrastructures of the centralised banking industry.

Abstract: Practices of self-care and social support have long been identified across social media platforms and apps, as people find new ways of using and adapting digital technologies to mediate and address personal and public health issues. But digital health participation is considerably contested and unevenly experienced, whether through the commodified ‘platformization’ of the health sector, or in the potentially ‘unhealthy’ engagement with dominant social media platforms or dating and hookup apps. Contemporary policy frameworks for participatory, digital-enabled healthcare (e.g., NHS, 2019) assume that we all engage in health or help seeking practices online, but have no answers to associated risks of over-exposure, invasive health surveillance or experiences of discrimination and harassment online, particularly for those at the margins. In our case studies, this is pertinent for transgender, non-binary and female hookup app users, people seeking support for mental ill-health, illicit drug users participating in crypto-markets and dark web communities. In response to this scenario, this panel asks: what are the forms and capacities for collective care in the current digital ecosystem, between social media platforms and dating apps struggling to address harassment or mental wellbeing, within health service-supported online forums, and across the dark web? This panel looks at evidence and answers, as well as research practices and ethics, to understand personal and collective attempts to negotiate, manage, circumvent and otherwise find ways to reinvent cultures of care through digital platforms.

Abstract: Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are a recent socio-technical innovation that seeks to disrupt the existing monetary system. Through mundane uses of this new digital cash, they provide a social critique of the centralized infrastructures of the banking industry. This paper outlines an ethnographic research agenda for this new digital frontier of social practice and exchange and the human affordances of engaging with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Firstly we argue that the use of Bitcoin can be seen as acts of social resistance and a form of social mobility that harnesses the emergent, serendipitous and dynamic properties of digital community. We then outline the disruptive nature of borderless, affordable and instantaneous international transfers within social practice. Finally, we identify the possible permutations of trust that may be found in the technical affordances of Bitcoin and how these relate to user (pseudo)anonymity, cybertheft, cyberfraud, and consumer protection. Bringing together these three key areas we highlight the importance of understanding the ordinary (rather than extra-ordinary) uses of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. We contend that focusing upon users interactions with Bitcoin as a system and culture will shed light upon mundane acts of socio-technical disruption, acts that critique and provide alternative financial exchange practices to the economic and regulatory financial infrastructures of the centralised banking industry.

Abstract: This paper is a contemplation of a digital ethnography with the community surrounding Silk Road, the first widely used cryptomarket for drugs on the Dark Web. To position the study within the broader field of illegal anthropology, it provides links between the existing literature on the study of cryptomarkets with relevant anthropological scholarship. A theory of piracy is interrogated for its explanatory capacity of the digital pirates of the Dark Web. The start of the study unexpectedly coincided with the FBI seizure of Silk Road in October 2013. The field site disappearance provoked a practice-based and conceptual rewiring. The paper unpacks how the ‘hydra effect’ introduced to conceptualise resilient innovation within cryptomarkets can also apply to the multiplicity of identities linked to research practice. This effect also raises how the knowledge production within digital ethnographic practice may be reconfigured through notions of opportunism, replication, obsolescence, regeneration, iteration, adaptation and proliferation.

Abstract: This panel explores digital pleasures that arise through the entanglement of bodies and digital technologies. Focusing on the digital structures and affordances that facilitate seeking, receiving and giving pleasure we analyse the ways in which intimacy is not only interactive, but also profoundly embodied. Haraway’s work in particular highlights the importance of taking seriously the nexus of human bodies and technologies and attending to the ways in which technologies not only deliver and mediate pleasure, but potentially expand upon our capacity to experience it. This panel explores how mediated practices engage the body as a site of pleasure and embodied affective intensity. Within this frame, we suggest that digitally mediated pleasures, while widely consumed, still have a hint of the ‘fringe’ or ‘subversive’. As well as proposing a theoretical framework for understanding embodied digital pleasures, this panel also examines specific examples of digital pleasure from sex to drugs and sound. To date the research corpus has largely focused upon the micro-social interactions of digital intimacies. This emphasis on relational intimacy puts the body into the background of the digitally mediated encounter and limits the ways in which we can talk about embodiment, sex and pleasure online. Embodied pleasure is intrinsic to the human condition, and digital media is deeply embedded in contemporary life. How these intersect is a key piece of the puzzle of what it means to be human in contemporary society.

Abstract: In this panel we consider how social actors situate uses of technologies within systems of moral norms and values while at the same time compelling the creation of new ones. Popular discourse tends to present dualistic thinking of the positive and negative impacts of technologies. Scholars have engaged with the internet and digital media, emphasising emancipatory subcultures (Coleman 2014; Gehl 2016, 2018) or presenting a critical view of the constraining aspects of networked technologies (Fish & Follis 2019; Fuchs 2014; Lovink 2016). These approaches are complimented by scholarship that considers technological practices and how they are embedded in social and cultural cosmologies (Burrell 2012; Horst & Foster 2018; Miller et. al. 2016). We argue for a closer integration of these bodies of scholarship through an examination of the contentious moral economies operating in emergent social spaces. The panel interrogates the relationship that social, political and economic actors have between their own ideas about what is good, appropriate and right and the diversity of orientations towards trust in techno-bureaucratic systems. We draw attention to immaterial systems and consider the social relationships and individual and collective imaginations that shape the production and experience of networked technologies. Through the papers, we articulate the forms of negotiation, resistance and refusal that occur when diverse moral universes, techno-regulating systems, and the conditions in which people find themselves collide.

Abstract: This issue of M/C Journal rejects the association of darkness with immorality. In digital communication, the possibilities of darkness are greater than simple fears of what is hidden in online networks. Instead, new work in an emerging field of “dark social” studies’ consider “dark” as holding the potential for autonomy away from the digital visibilities that pervade economic, political, and surveillance logics of the present age. We shall not be afraid of the dark. We start from a technical rather than moral definition of darkness (Gehl), a definition that conceives of dark spaces as having legitimacies and anonymities against structural surveillance. At the same time, breaking away from techno-centric critiques of the dark allows a humanisation of how dark is embodied and performed at individual and structural levels. Other readings of digitally mediated dark (Fisher and Bolter) suggest tensions between exploitative potentials and deep societal reflection, and the ability for a new dark age (Bridle) to allow us to explore unknown potentials. Together these perspectives allow our authors a way to use dark to question and upend the unresting pressure and acceptance of—and hierarchy given to—the light in aesthetics of power and social transformation.  While we reject, however, the reduction of “dark” to “immoral” as we are not blind to “bad actors” lurking in hidden spaces (see Potter, forthcoming). Dark algorithms and their encoded biases shape our online lives. Not everyone has the ability to go off grid or create their own dark networks. Colonial settlerism often hides its brutal logics behind discourses of welfare. And some of us are forced to go dark against our will, as in the case of economies or nations being shut out of communication networks. But above all, the tensions produced in darkness, going dark, and acting dark show the normative powers beyond only focusing on the light.  Taken as a whole, the articles in this issue explore the tensions between dark and connected, opting in and opting out, and exposure and retreat. They challenge binaries that reduce our vision to the monochromaticism of dark and light. They explain how the concept of “dark” expands opportunities for existence and persistence beyond datafication. They point to moral, ethical, and pragmatic responses of selves and communities seeking to be/belong in/of the dark.  The issue starts with a high-stakes contest: what happens when an entire country is forced to go dark? While the articles in this issue were in review, Australian Facebook users were abruptly introduced to a unique form of darkness when, overnight, all news posts were removed from Facebook. Leaver’s feature article responds to tell the story of how Facebook and Google fought the Australian media law, and nobody won. Simply put, the platforms-cum-infrastructures did not want the government to mandate terms of their payments and business to traditional news organisations, so pulled the plug on Australia. As Leaver points out, Facebook’s cull not only made news media go dark, but in the midst of a pandemic and ongoing bushfires, prevented government agencies from posting and sharing government public health information, weather and wind patterns, and some State Emergency Services information.  His article positions darkness on the spectrum from visibility to invisibility and focuses on the complex interplays of who is in control of, or has the power over, visibility. Facebook’s power to darken vital voices in society was unprecedented in Australia, a form of “de-platforming at scale” (Crawford). It seemed that Facebook (and as Leaver explains, Goog le, to a lesser extent) were using Australia to test platform power and legislative response. The results of this experiment, Leaver argues, was not a dawn of a new dark age—without the misinforming-glare of Facebook (see Cinque in this issue)—but confirmatory evidence of the political economy of national media: News Corp and other large traditional media companies received millions from Facebook and Google in exchange for the latter being exempt from the very law in question. Everyone won, except the Australians looking to experiment and explore alternatives in a new darkness. Scared of the dark, politicians accepted a mutually agreed transfer of ad-revenue from Google and Facebook to large and incumbent media organisations; and with that, hope of exploring a world mediated without the glare of digital incumbents was snuffed out. These agreements, of course, found user privacy, algorithmic biases, and other concerns of computational light out of scope. Playing off the themes of status quo of institutionalised social media companies, Cinque examines how social online spaces (SOS) which are governed by logics of surveillance and datafication embodied in the concept of the “gazing elite” (data aggregators including social media), can prompt anxieties for users regarding data privacy. Her work in the issue particularly observes that anxiety for many users is shaped by this manifestation of the “dark” as it relates to the hidden processes of data capture and processing by the mainstream platforms, surveillant digital objects that are incorporated into the Internet of Things, and “dark” or black boxed automated decisions which censor expression and self-representation. Against this way of conceptualising digital darkness, Cinque argues that dark SOS which use VPNs or the Tor browser to evade monitoring are valuable to users precisely because of their ability to evade the politics of visibility and resist the power of the gazing elite. Continuing away from the ubiquitous and all consuming blue glow of Facebook to more esoteric online communities, Maddox and Heemsbergen use their article to expand a critique on the normative computational logics which define the current information age (based on datafication, tracking, prediction, and surveillance of human socialities). They consider how “digging in the shadows” and “tinkering” with cryptocurrencies in the “dark” is shaping alternative futures based on social, equitable, and reciprocal relations. Their work traces cryptocurrencies—a “community generated technology” made by makers, miners and traders on darknets—from its emergence during a time of global economic upheaval, uncertainty and mistrust in centralised financial systems, through to new generations of cryptocurrencies like Dogecoin that, based on lessons from early cryptocurrencies, are mutating and becoming absorbed into larger economic structures. These themes are explored using an innovative analytical framework considering the “construction, disruption, contention, redirection, and finally absorption of emerging techno-potentials into larger structures”. The authors conclude by arguing that experiments in the dark don’t stay in the dark, but are radical potentials that impact and shape larger social forms. Bradfield and Fredericks take a step back from a focus on potentially arcane online cultures to position dark in an explicit provocation to settler politics’ fears and anxieties. They show how being dark in Australia is embodied and everyday. In doing so, they draw back the veil on the uncontested normality of fear of the dark-as-object. Their article’s examples offer a stark demonstration of how for Indigenous peoples, associations of “dark” fear and danger are built into the structural mechanisms that shape and maintain colonial understandings of Indigenous peoples and their bodies as part of larger power structures. They note activist practices that provoke settlers to confront individuals, communities, and politics that proclaim “I’m not afraid of the Dark” (see Cotes in Bradfield and Fredericks). Drawing on a related embodied refusal of poorly situated connotations of the dark, Hardley considers the embodied ways mobile media have been deployed in the urban night and observes that in darkness, and the night, while vision is obscured and other senses are heightened we also encounter enmeshed cultural relationships of darkness and danger. Drawing on the postphenomenological concept of multistability, Hardley frames engagement with mobile media as a particular kind of body-technology relation in which the same technology can be used by different people in multiple ways, as people assign different meanings to the technology. Presenting empirical research on participants’ night-time mobile media practices, Hardley analyses how users co-opt mobile media functionalities to manage their embodied experiences of the dark. The article highlights how mobile media practices of privacy and isolation in urban spaces can be impacted by geographical location and urban darkness, and are also distinctly gendered.  Smith explores how conversations flow across social media platforms and messaging technologies and in and out of sight across the public domain. Darkness is the backstage where backchannel conversations take place outside of public view, in private and parochial spaces, and in the shadow spaces where communication crosses between platforms. This narrative threading view of conversation, which Smith frames as a multiplatform accomplishment, responds to the question held by so many researchers and people trying to interpret what people say in public on social media. Is what we see the tip of an iceberg or just a small blip in the ocean? From Smith’s work we can see that so much happens in the dark, beyond the gaze of the onlooker, where conversational practices move by their own logic. Smith argues that drawing on pre-digital conversational analysis techniques associated with ethnomethodology will illuminate the social logics that structure online interaction and increase our understanding of online sociality forces. Set in the context of merging platforms and the “rise of data”, Lee presents issues that undergird contemporary, globally connected media systems.  In translating descriptions of complex systems, the article critically discusses the changing relational quality of “the shadow of hierarchy” and “Platform Power”. The governmental use of private platforms, and the influence it has on power and opportunity for government and civil society is prefigured. The “dark” in this work is lucidly presented as a relationality; an expression of differing values, logics, and (techno)socialities. The author finds and highlights the line between traditional notions of "infrastructure" and the workings of contemporary digital platforms which is becoming increasingly indistinct. Lee concludes by showing how the intersection of platforms with public institutions and infrastructures has moulded society’s light into an evolving and emergent shadow of hierarchy over many domains where there are, as always, those that will have the advantage—and those that do not. Finally, Jethani and Fordyce present an understanding of “data provenance” as a metaphor and method both for analysing data as a social and political artefact. The authors point to the term via an inter-disciplinary history as a way to explain a custodial history of objects. They adroitly argue that in our contemporary communication environment that data is more than just a transact-able commodity. Data is vital—being acquired, shared, interpreted and re-used with significant influence and socio-technical affects. As we see in this article, the key methods that rely on the materiality and subjectivity of data extraction and interpretation are not to be ignored. Not least because they come with ethical challenges as the authors make clear. As an illuminating methodology, “data provenance” offers a narrative for data assets themselves (asking what, when, who, how, and why). In the process, the kinds of valences unearthed as being private, secret, or exclusive reveal aspects of the ‘dark’ (and ‘light’) that is the focus of this issue. References Bridle, James. New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future. London, UK: Verso Books, 2018. Crawford, Kate (katecrawford). “It happened: Facebook just went off the deep end in Australia. They are blocking *all* news content to Australians, and *no* Australian media can post news. This is what showdowns between states and platforms look like. It's deplatforming at scale.” 18 Feb. 2021. 22 Apr. 2021 〈 https://twitter.com/katecrawford/status/1362149306170368004 〉 . Fisher, Joshua A., and Jay David Bolter. "Ethical Considerations for AR Experiences at Dark Tourism Sites." 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Mixed and Augmented Reality Adjunct (ISMAR-Adjunct) (2018): 365-69. Gehl, Robert. Weaving the Dark Web: Legitimacy on Freenet, Tor, and I2p. The Information Society Series. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018. Potter, Martin. “Bad Actors Never Sleep: Content Manipulation on Reddit.” Eds. Toija Cinque, Robert W. Gehl, Luke Heemsbergen, and Alexia Maddox. Continuum Dark Social Special Issue (forthcoming).

Abstract: Conspiracies have been a cultural mainstay for decades (Melley). While often framed as an American problem (Melley), social media has contributed to their global reach (Gerts et al.). Bruns, Harrington, and Hurcombe have traced the contemporary movement of conspiracy theories into the cultural mainstream from fringe conspiracist groups on social media platforms such as Facebook through their greater uptake in more diverse communities and to substantial amplification by celebrities, sports stars, and media outlets. Consequently, conspiracy theories that were once the product of subcultural groups have increasingly mixed into popular and authoritative media (Marwick and Lewis) and entertainment (Hyzen and van den Bulck; van den Bulck and Hyzen). Over the past five years conspiracy theories, whether they be anti-vaccination, politically motivated, or pop-cultural artefacts, have found their way into mainstream cultural discourse. Increasingly, conspiracy theories, once regarded as the domain of largely harmless eccentrics, are having real, material effects. These real-world harms are evident across a number of domains of social life, from the storming of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 (Moskalenko and McCauley) to the effects of vaccine refusal and resistance which continue to stymie attempts to control the global COVID-19 pandemic (Baker, Wade, and Walsh). Digital spaces and communities have made conspiracy theories more accessible and transmissible. Conspiracies are persistent, resistant, and pervasive. The illusion of neat segmentation between the sites of conspiracy theorising and mainstream media content generation has vanished. However, our understanding of what motivates those engaging with and disseminating conspiracy theories is still partial and incomplete. While there is a large corpus of social psychological research into conspiracies, much of this research is focused on deficits in logic, reasoning, and/or personality traits. The focus of the ‘deficits’ of those draw to conspiracy theories is also reflected in popular discourse, where those believing in conspiracy theories are described within a variety of synonyms for the word ‘stupid’ (Chu, Yuan, and Liu). In this issue, we approach the topic of conspiracy from a different standpoint, exploring the sociological conditions that enable conspiracies to flourish. We have assembled a variety of articles, both empirical and conceptual, from which a more complex social picture of conspiracy emerges. To begin examining the complex social life of conspiracy theories, our feature article by Brownwyn Fredericks, Abraham Bradfield, Sue McAvoy, James Ward, Shea Spierings, Troy Combo, and Agnes Toth-Peter cuts through the conspiracy frame to a very real world example of the consequences of conspiracy. They examine the specific social contexts and media ecologies through which COVID-19 conspiracies have flourished in some (not all) Indigenous communities in Australia. Their analysis highlights the detrimental impacts of unresolved elements of settler colonialism that propagate conspiracist thinking within these communities. Through research conducted with stakeholder participants from the Indigenous health sector (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) they outline a series of recommendations for how we can constructively address the demonstrated impact of circulating misinformation upon Indigenous communities in Australia. In their recommendations they reinforce the need to centralise Indigenous voices and expertise in our social and political life. Other articles in the issue explore how to theorise conspiracism, present examples of contemporary conspiracism in digital media, unpack methods for how to conduct research in this socially contentious space, and highlight the consequences of conspiracies. They draw examples of communities entangled with conspiracy theories and media environments across the world. Absence and presence (of evidence) are both important elements in conspiracy theorising. In contrast to scholarship that focusses on the spread of conspiracy-style misinformation, Tyler Easterbrook’s examination of dead links or ‘li nk rot’ online demonstrates how the absence and removal of information can be a powerful motivator of conspiracy rhetoric. Easterbrook’s work demonstrates the potential complexities of moderation models that emphasise the removal of conspiratorial content. The absence of content can be as powerful as its presence. Scott DeJong’s and Alex Bustamante’s article uses novel methods to interrogate the analogies we frequently use when discussing the spread of conspiracy theories online. In designing their own board system to model how conspiracy theories might spread, they speak to a growing body of work that likens conspiracy theories to game systems. DeJong’s and Bustamante’s article highlighted the powerful capacity of creative methods to speak to social problems. Echoing Easterbrook’s warning about the power of content removal to fuel conspiracy theorising, in their simulating DeJong and Bustamante found that there is an “interplay between the removal of content and its spread” and argue that “removing conspiracy is a band-aid solution to a larger problem”. With current attention focussed on the problem of moderating conspiracy and misinformation in digital ecologies, these articles are important considerations about the relative success of such a strategy. In their commentary examining so-called COVID-19 ‘cures’, Stephanie Alice Baker and Alexia Maddox explore how hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin shifted from potential COVID treatments to objects embroiled in conspiracy during the pandemic. Baker and Maddox highlight the interwoven nature of the conspiracy landscape illustrating the roles that public figures and influencers played in amplifying conspiratorial discourse and knowledge about these drugs. Importantly, as with DeJong and Bustamante, and as also highlighted by Easterbrook, they highlight how tackling conspiracy theories is not as simple as providing “accurate” facts to counter false and misleading information. Baker and Maddox argue that, paradoxically, the process of debunking which included mockery and derision “reinforces the audience segmentation that occurs in the current media ecology by virtue of alternative media with mockery and ridicule strengthening in and out group dynamics”. When debunking succumbs to ridicule, they suggest that critics may be strengthening people’s commitment to conspiratorial narratives and alternative influence networks. Tresa LeClerc’s article explores the increasing entanglement of health and wellness with alternative right (or alt-right) conspiracies, focussing on underlying themes of white nationalism within these communities. LeClerc’s piece compellingly traces the ideological underpinnings of purity within the paleo diet that already blend pseudoscience and conspiracy, highlighting the ways wellness spaces have cultivated modes of thinking that are conducive to alt-right conspiracies. Also delving into the intersections of wellness and conspiracy, Marie Heřmanová explores conspirituality and the politicisation of spiritual influencers during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the case of prominent Czech lifestyle Instagrammer Helena Houdová who became an outspoken anti-vaxxer and COVID denialist. In a rich case study, Heřmanová examines the ways Helena blends her feminine aesthetic and aspirational and individualistic take on spirituality with conspiracy messages informed by QAnon and political messaging that speaks to both national history and global trends. Heřmanová astutely observes that the rise of conspirituality reveals the capacity of these influencers to bridge the gap between the everyday and personal, and the collective narratives of conspiracies such as QAnon.     Continuing to explore how conspiracy theories intersect with embodied and digital environments, in her article on ‘Coronaconspiracies’ Merlyna Lim examines the role algorithms and users play in facilitating conspiracy theories during the pandemic. Lim contends that social media provides a fertile environment for conspiracies to flourish, while maintaining that “social media algorithms do not have an absolute hegemony in translating the high visibility or even the virality of conspiracy theories into the beliefs in them”. As Lim explains, human users retain their agency online; it is their “choices” and “preferences” that are informed by the algorithmic dynamics of these technologies. Extending research into the relationship between conspiracy and algorithms, the impacts of labelling are foregrounded in the work of Ahmed Al-Rawi, Carmen Celestini, Nicole Stewart, and Nathan Worku. Their article presents a reverse-engineering approach to understanding how Google’s autocomplete feature assigns subtitles to widely known conspiracists. Google’s algorithmic approach to labelling actors is proprietary knowledge, which blackboxes this process to researchers and the wider public. This article provides a technical peek into how this may work, but also raises the concern that these labels do not reflect what is publicly known about these actors. Their work provides an insight into the ways that the Google autocomplete subtitling feature may further contribute to the negative real-world impacts that these conspiracists, and other such toxic actors, have. Stijn Peeters and Tom Willaert take us into the fringes of the online ecosystem to explore ways to research conspiracist communities on Telegram. They extrapolate on Richard Rogers‘s edict to ​​repurpose the methods of the medium and take us through a case-based examination of how to conduct a structural analysis of forwarded messages to identify conspiracy communities. In weighing up the results of applying this technique to Dutch-speaking conspiracist narratives and communities on Telegram they highlight the methodological gains of such a technique and the ethical considerations that doing this style of data gathering and analysis can raise. Moving away from the fringes, Naomi Smith and Clare Southerton take us into the belly of popular culture with their examination of the #FreeBritney movement and raise the proposition of conspiracy as a site of pleasure. They turn on its head the assumption that conspiracy thinking is because of a deficient and deviant understanding and point to the appeal and pleasure of engaging in the chase of partial threads and leads found in social media that could be woven into an explanation, or conspiracy. Drawing from fan studies, they highlight that pleasure is not a new site of motivation and that a lot can be learned by applying it as an explanatory frame for why people engage with conspiracies. The diverse body of scholarship assembled in this special issue illustrates the complex nature of contemporary conspiracies as they find expression in digital spaces and media. There are a variety of approaches to understanding this phenomenon that highlight how strategies of control and technological intervention may not be straightforwardly successful. The contributions to this issue demonstrate, from a range of perspectives, the importance of understanding how and why conspiracy theories matter to the communities that embrace them if we are to address their social consequences. References Baker, Stephanie Alice, Matthew Wade, and Michael James Walsh. "The Challenges of Responding to Misinformation during a Pandemic: Content Moderation and the Limitations of the Concept of Harm." Media International Australia 177 (2020): 103-07. Bruns, Axel, Stephen Harrington, and Edward Hurcombe. “‘Corona? 5G? Or Both?’: The Dynamics of COVID-19/5G Conspiracy Theories on Facebook." Media International Australia 177 (2020): 12-29. Chu, Haoran, Shupei Yuan, and Sixiao Liu. "Call Them Covidiots: Exploring the Effects of Aggressive Communication Style and Psychological Distance in the Communication of Covid-19." Public Understanding of Science 30.3 (2021): 240-57. Gerts, Dax, et al. “‘Thought I’d Share First’ and Other Conspiracy Theory Tweets from the Covid-19 Infodemic: Exploratory Study." JMIR Public Health Surveill 7.4 (2021): e26527. Hyzen, Aaron, and Hilde van den Bulck. "Conspiracies, Ideological Entrepreneurs, and Digital Popular Culture." Media and Communication 9 (2021): 179–88. Marwick, Alice, and Rebecca Lewis. "Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online." New York: Data & Society Research Institute, 2017. 7-19. Melley, Timothy. Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America. Cornell University Press, 2016. Moskalenko, Sophia, and Clark McCauley. "QAnon: Radical Opinion Versus Radical Action." Perspectives on Terrorism 15.2 (2021): 142-46. Van den Bulck, Hilde, and Aaron Hyzen. "Of Lizards and Ideological Entrepreneurs: Alex Jones and Infowars in the Relationship between Populist Nationalism and the Post-Global Media Ecology." International Communication Gazette 82.1 (2020): 42-59.

Abstract: Introduction This article situates the dark as a liminal and creative space of experimentation where tensions are generative and people tinker with emerging technologies to create alternative futures. Darkness need not mean chaos and fear of violence – it can mean privacy and protection. We define dark as an experimental space based upon uncertainties rather than computational knowns (Bridle) and then demonstrate via a case study of cryptocurrencies the contribution of dark and liminal social spaces to future(s)-making. Cryptocurrencies are digital cash systems that use decentralised (peer-to-peer) networking to enable irreversible payments (Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz). Cryptocurrencies are often clones or variations on the ‘original’ Bitcoin payment systems protocol (Trump et al.) that was shared with the cryptographic community through a pseudonymous and still unknown author(s) (Nakamoto), creating a founder mystery. Due to the open creation process, a new cryptocurrency is relatively easy to make. However, many of them are based on speculative bubbles that mirror Bitcoin, Ethereum, and ICOs’ wealth creation. Examples of cryptocurrencies now largely used for speculation due to their volatility in holding value are rampant, with online clearing houses competing to trade hundreds of different assets from AAVE to ZIL. Many of these altcoins have little to no following or trading volume, leading to their obsolescence. Others enjoy immense popularity among dedicated communities of backers and investors. Consequently, while many cryptocurrency experiments fail or lack adoption and drop from the purview of history, their constant variation also contributes to the undertow of the future that pulls against more visible surface waves of computational progress. The article is structured to first define how we understand and leverage ‘dark’ against computational cultures. We then apply thematic and analytical tactics to articulate future-making socio-technical experiments in the dark. Based on past empirical work of the authors (Maddox "Netnography") we focus on crypto-cultures’ complex emancipatory and normative tensions via themes of construction, disruption, contention, redirection, obsolescence, and iteration. Through these themes we illustrate the mutation and absorption of dark experimental spaces into larger social structures. The themes we identify are not meant as a complete or necessarily serial set of occurrences, but nonetheless contribute a new vocabulary for students of technology and media to see into and grapple with the dark. Embracing the Dark: Prework & Analytical Tactics for Outside the Known To frame discussion of the dark here as creative space for alternative futures, we focus on scholars who have deeply engaged with notions of socio-technical darkness. This allows us to explore outside the blinders of computational light and, with a nod to Sassen, dig in the shadows of known categories to evolve the analytical tactics required for the study of emerging socio-technical conditions. We understand the Dark Web to usher shifting and multiple definitions of darkness, from a moral darkness to a technical one (Gehl). From this work, we draw the observation of how technologies that obfuscate digital tracking create novel capacities for digital cultures in spaces defined by anonymity for both publisher and user. Darknets accomplish this by overlaying open internet protocols (e.g. TCP/IP) with non-standard protocols that encrypt and anonymise information (Pace). Pace traces concepts of darknets to networks in the 1970s that were 'insulated’ from the internet’s predecessor ARPANET by air gap, and then reemerged as software protocols similarly insulated from cultural norms around intellectual property. ‘Darknets’ can also be considered in ternary as opposed to binary terms (Gehl and McKelvey) that push to make private that which is supposed to be public infrastructure, and push private platforms (e.g. a Personal Computer) to make public networks via common bandwidth. In this way, darknets feed new possibilities of communication from both common infrastructures and individual’s platforms. Enabling new potentials of community online and out of sight serves to signal what the dark accomplishes for the social when measured against an otherwise unending light of computational society. To this point, a new dark age can be welcomed insofar it allows an undecided future outside of computational logics that continually define and refine the possible and probable (Bridle). This argument takes von Neumann’s 1945 declaration that “all stable processes we shall predict. All unstable processes we shall control” (in Bridle 21) as a founding statement for computational thought and indicative of current society. The hope expressed by Bridle is not an absence of knowledge, but an absence of knowing the future. Past the computational prison of total information awareness within an accelerating information age (Castells) is the promise of new formations of as yet unknowable life. Thus, from Bridle’s perspective, and ours, darkness can be a place of freedom and possibility, where the equality of being in the dark, together, is not as threatening as current privileged ways of thinking would suggest (Bridle 15). The consequences of living in a constant glaring light lead to data hierarchies “leaching” (Bridle) into everything, including social relationships, where our data are relationalised while our relations are datafied (Maddox and Heemsbergen) by enforcing computational thinking upon them. Darkness becomes a refuge that acknowledges the power of unknowing, and a return to potential for social, equitable, and reciprocal relations. This is not to say that we envision a utopian life without the shadow of hierarchy, but rather an encouragement to dig into those shadows made visible only by the brightest of lights. The idea of digging in the shadows is borrowed from Saskia Sassen, who asks us to consider the ‘master categories’ that blind us to alternatives. According to Sassen (402), while master categories have the power to illuminate, their blinding power keeps us from seeing other presences in the landscape: “they produce, then, a vast penumbra around that center of light. It is in that penumbra that we need to go digging”. We see darkness in the age of digital ubiquity as rejecting the blinding ‘master category’ of computational thought. Computational thought defines social/economic/political life via what is static enough to predict or unstable enough to render a need to control. Otherwise, the observable, computable, knowable, and possible all follow in line. Our dig in the shadows posits a penumbra of protocols – both of computational code and human practice – that circle the blinding light of known digital communications. We use the remainder of this short article to describe these themes found in the dark that offer new ways to understand the movements and moments of potential futures that remain largely unseen. Thematic Resonances in the Dark This section considers cryptocultures of the dark. We build from a thematic vocabulary that has been previously introduced from empirical examples of the crypto-market communities which tinker with and through the darkness provided by encryption and privacy technologies (Maddox "Netnography"). Here we refine these future-making themes through their application to events surrounding community-generated technology aimed at disrupting centralised banking systems: cryptocurrencies (Maddox, Singh, et al.). Given the overlaps in collective values and technologies between crypto-communities, we find it useful to test the relevance of these themes to the experimental dynamics surrounding cryptocurrencies. We unpack these dynamics as construction, rupture and disruption, redirection, and the flip-sided relationship between obsolescence and iteration leading to mutation and absorption. This section provides a working example for how these themes adapt in application to a community dwelling at the edge of experimental technological possibilities. The theme of construction is both a beginning and a materialisation of a value field. It originates within the cyberlibertarians’ ideological stance towards using technological innovations to ‘create a new world in the shell of the old’ (van de Sande) which has been previously expressed through the concept of constructive activism (Maddox, Barratt, et al.). This libertarian ideology is also to be found in the early cultures that gave rise to cryptocurrencies. Through their interest in the potential of cryptography technologies related to social and political change, the Cypherpunks mailing list formed in 1992 (Swartz). The socio-cultural field surrounding cryptocurrencies, however, has always consisted of a diverse ecosystem of vested interests building collaborations from “goldbugs, hippies, anarchists, cyberpunks, cryptographers, payment systems experts, currency activists, commodity traders, and the curious” (Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz 262). Through the theme of construction we can consider architectures of collaboration, cooperation, and coordination developed by technically savvy populations. Cryptocurrencies are often developed as code by teams who build in mechanisms for issuance (e.g. ‘mining’) and other controls (Conway). Thus, construction and making of cryptocurrencies tend to be collective yet decentralised. Cryptocurrencies arose during a time of increasing levels of distrust in governments and global financial instability from the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2013), whilst gaining traction through their usefulness in engaging in illicit trade (Saiedi, Broström, and Ruiz). It was through this rupture in the certainties of ‘the old system’ that this technology, and the community developing it, sought to disrupt the financial system (Maddox, Singh, et al.; Nelms et al.). Her e we see the utility of the second theme of rupture and disruption to illustrate creative experimentation in the liminal and emergent spaces cryptocurrencies afford. While current crypto crazes (e.g. NFTs, ICOs) have their detractors, Cohen suggests, somewhat ironically, that the  momentum for change of the crypto current was “driven by the grassroots, and technologically empowered, movement to confront the ills perceived to be powered and exacerbated by market-based capitalism, such as climate change and income inequality” (Cohen 739). Here we can start to envision how subterranean currents that emerge from creative experimentations in the dark impact global social forces in multifaceted ways – even as they are dragged into the light. Within a disrupted environment characterised by rupture, contention and redirection is rife (Maddox "Disrupting"). Contention and redirection illustrate how competing agendas bump and grind to create a generative tension around a deep collective desire for social change. Contention often emerges within an environment of hacks and scams, of which there are many stories in the cryptocurrency world (see Bartlett for an example of OneCoin, for instance; Kavanagh, Miscione, and Ennis). Other aspects of contention emerge around how the technology works to produce (mint) cryptocurrencies, including concern over the environmental impact of producing cryptocurrencies (Goodkind, Jones, and Berrens) and the production of non-fungible tokens for the sale of digital assets (Howson). Contention also arises through the gendered social dynamics of brogramming culture skewing inclusive and diverse engagement (Bowles). Shifting from the ideal of inclusion to the actual practice of crypto-communities begs the question of whose futures are being made. Contention and redirections are also evidenced by ‘hard forks’ in cryptocurrency. The founder mystery resulted in the gifting of this technology to a decentralised and leaderless community, materialised through the distributed consensus processes to approve software updates to a cryptocurrency. This consensus system consequently holds within it the seeds for governance failures (Trump et al.), the first of which occurred with the ‘hard forking’ of Bitcoin into Bitcoin cash in 2017 (Webb). Hard forks occur when developers and miners no longer agree on a proposed change to the software: one group upgraded to the new software while the others operated on the old rules. The resulting two separate blockchains and digital currencies concretised the tensions and disagreements within the community. This forking resulted initially in a shock to the market value of, and trust in, the Bitcoin network, and the dilution of adoption networks across the two cryptocurrencies. The ongoing hard forks of Bitcoin Cash illustrate the continued contention occurring within the community as crypto-personalities pit against each other (Hankin; Li). As these examples show, not all experiments in cryptocurrencies are successful; some become obsolete through iteration (Arnold). Iteration engenders mutations in the cultural framing of socio-technical experiments. These mutations of meaning and signification then facilitate their absorption into novel futures, showing the ternary nature of how what happens in the dark works with what is known by the light. As a rhetorical device, cryptocurrencies have been referred to as a currency (a payment system) or a commodity (an investment or speculation vehicle; Nelms et al. 21). However, new potential applications for the underlying technologies continue emerge. For example, Ethereum, the second-most dominant cryptocurrency after Bitcoin, now offers smart contract technology (decentralised autonomous organisations, DAO; Kavanagh, Miscione, and Ennis) and is iterating technology to dramatically reduce the energy consumption required to mine and mint the non-fungible tokens (NFTs) associated with crypto art (Wintermeyer). Here we can see how these rhetorical framings may represent iterative shifts and meaning-mutation that is as pragmatic as it is cultural. While we have considered here the themes of obsolescence and iteration threaded through the technological differentiations amongst cryptocurrencies, what should we make of these rhetorical or cultural mutations? This cultural mutation, we argue, can be seen most clearly in the resurgence of Dogecoin. Dogecoin is a cryptocurrency launched in 2013 that takes its name and logo from a Shiba Inu meme that was popular several years ago (Potts and Berg). We can consider Dogecoin as a playful infrastructure (Rennie) and cultural product that was initially designed to provide a low bar for entry into the market. Its affordability is kept in place by the ability for miners to mint an unlimited number of coins. Dogecoin had a large resurgence of value and interest just after the meme-centric Reddit community Wallstreetbets managed to drive the share price of video game retailer GameStop to gain 1,500% (Potts and Berg). In this instance we see the mutation of a cryptocurrency into memecoin, or cultural product, for which the value is a prism to the wild fluctuations of internet culture itself, linking cultural bubbles to financial ones. In this case, technologies iterated in the dark mutated and surfaced as cultural bubbles through playful infrastructures that intersected with financial systems. The story of dogecoin articulates how cultural mutation articulates the absorption of emerging techno-potentials into larger structures. Conclusion From creative experiments digging in the dark shadows of global socio-economic forces, we can see how the future is formed beneath the surface of computational light. Yet as we write, cryptocurrencies are being absorbed by centralising and powerful entities to integrate them into global economies. Examples of large institutions hoarding Bitcoin include the crypto-counterbalancing between the Chinese state through its digital currency DCEP (Vincent) and Facebook through the Libra project. Vincent observes that the state-backed DCEP project is the antithesis of the decentralised community agenda for cryptocurrencies to enact the separation of state and money. 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Abstract: Introduction Medical misinformation and conspiracies have thrived during the current infodemic as a result of the volume of information people have been exposed to during the disease outbreak. Given that SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) is a novel coronavirus discovered in 2019, much remains unknown about the disease. Moreover, a considerable amount of what was originally thought to be known has turned out to be inaccurate, incomplete, or based on an obsolete knowledge of the virus. It is in this context of uncertainty and confusion that conspiracies flourish. Michael Golebiewski and danah boyd’s work on ‘data voids’ highlights the ways that actors can work quickly to produce conspiratorial content to fill a void. The data void absent of high-quality data surrounding COVID-19 provides a fertile information environment for conspiracies to prosper (Chou et al.). Conspiracism is the belief that society and social institutions are secretly controlled by a powerful group of corrupt elites (Douglas et al.). Michael Barkun’s typology of conspiracy reveals three components: 1) the belief that nothing happens by accident or coincidence; 2) nothing is as it seems: the "appearance of innocence" is to be suspected; 3) the belief that everything is connected through a hidden pattern. At the heart of conspiracy theories is narrative storytelling, in particular plots involving influential elites secretly colluding to control society (Fenster). Conspiracies following this narrative playbook have flourished during the pandemic. Pharmaceutical corporations profiting from national vaccine rollouts, and the emergency powers given to governments around the world to curb the spread of coronavirus, have led some to cast these powerful commercial and State organisations as nefarious actors – 'big evil' drug companies and the ‘Deep State’ – in conspiratorial narratives. Several drugs believed to be potential treatments for COVID-19 have become entangled with conspiracy. At the start of the pandemic scientists experimented with repurposing existing drugs as potential treatments for COVID-19 because safe and effective vaccines were not yet available. A series of antimicrobials with potential activity against SARS-CoV-2 were tested in clinical trials, including lopinavir/ritonavir, favipiravir and remdesivir (Smith et al.). Only hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin transformed from potential COVID treatments into conspiracy objects. This article traces how the hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin conspiracy theories were amplified in the news media and online. It highlights how debunking processes contribute to amplification effects due to audience segmentation in the current media ecology. We conceive of these amplification and debunking processes as key components of a ‘Conspiracy Course’ (Baker and Maddox), identifying the interrelations and tensions between amplification and debunking practices as a conspiracy develops, particularly through mainstream news, social media and alternative media spaces. We do this in order to understand how medical claims about potential treatments for COVID-19 succumb to conspiracism and how we can intervene in their development and dissemination. In this article we present a commentary on how public discourse and actors surrounding two potential treatments for COVID-19: the anti-malarial drug hydroxychloroquine and the anti-parasitic drug ivermectin became embroiled in conspiracy. We examine public discourse and events surrounding these treatments over a 24-month period from January 2020, when the virus gained global attention, to January 2022, the time this article was submitted. Our analysis is contextually informed by an extended digital ethnography into medical misinformation, which has included social media monitoring and observational digital field work of social media sites, news media, and digital media such as blogs, podcasts, and newsletters. Our analysis focusses on the role that public figures and influencers play in amplifying these conspiracies, as well as their amplification by some wellness influencers, referred to as “alt.health influencers” (Baker), and those affiliated with the Intellectual Dark Web, many of whom occupy status in alternative media spaces. The Intellectual Dark Web (IDW) is a term used to describe an alternative influence network comprised of public intellectuals including the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson and the British political commentator Douglas Murray. The term was coined by the American mathematician and podcast host Eric Weinstein, who described the IDW as a group opposed to “the gated institutional narrative” of the mainstream media and the political establishment (Kelsey). As a consequence, many associated with the IDW use alternative media, including podcasts and newsletters, as an "eclectic conversational space" where those intellectual thinkers excluded from mainstream conversational spaces in media, politics, and academia can “have a much easier time talking amongst ourselves” (Kelsey). In his analysis of the IDW, Parks describes these figures as "organic" intellectuals who build identification with their audiences by branding themselves as "reasonable thinkers" and reinforcing dominant narratives of polarisation. Hence, while these influential figures are influencers in so far as they cultivate an online audience as a vocation in exchange for social, economic and political gain, they are distinct from earlier forms of micro-celebrity (Senft; Marwick) in that they do not merely achieve fame on social media among a niche community of followers, but appeal to those disillusioned with the mainstream media and politics. The IDW are contrasted not with mainstream celebrities, as is the case with earlier forms of micro-celebrity (Abidin Internet Celebrity), but with the mainstream media and politics. A public figure, on the other hand, is a “famous person” broadcast in the media. While celebrities are public figures, public figures are not necessarily celebrities; a public figure is ‘a person of great public interest or familiarity’, such as a government official, politician, entrepreneur, celebrity, or athlete. Analysis In what follows we explore the role of influencers and public figures in amplifying the hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin conspiracy theories during the pandemic. As part of this analysis, we consider how debunking processes can further amplify these conspiracies, raising important questions about how to most effectively respond to conspiracies in the current media ecology. Discussions around hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin as potential treatments for COVID-19 emerged in early 2020 at the start of the pandemic when people were desperate for a cure, and safe and effective vaccines for the virus were not yet publicly available. While claims concerning the promising effects of both treatments emerged in the mainstream, the drugs remained experimental COVID treatments and had not yet received widespread acceptance among scientific and medical professionals. Much of the hype around these drugs as COVID “cures” emerged from preprints not yet subject to peer review and scientific studies based on unreliable data, which were retracted due to quality issues (Mehra et al.). Public figures, influencers, and news media organisations played a key role in amplifying these narratives in the mainstream, thereby extending the audience reach of these claims. However, their transformation into conspiracy objects followed different amplification processes for each drug. Hydroxychloroquine, the “Game Changer” Hydroxychloroquine gained public attention on 17 March 2020 when the US tech entrepreneur Elon Musk shared a Google Doc with his 40 million followers on Twitter, proposing “maybe worth considering chloroquine for C19”. Musk’s tweet was liked over 50,200 times and received more than 13,500 retweets. The tweet was followed by several other tweets that day in which Musk shared a series of graphs and a paper alluding to the “potential benefit” of hydroxychloroquine in in vitro and early clinical data. Although Musk is not a medical expert, he is a public figure with status and large online following, which contributed to the hype around hydroxychloroquine as a potential treatment for COVID-19. Following Musk’s comments, search interest in chloroquine soared and mainstream media outlets covered his apparent endorsement of the drug. On 19 March 2020, the Fox News programme Tucker Carlson Tonight cited a study declaring hydroxychloroquine to have a “100% cure rate against coronavirus” (Gautret et al.). Within hours another public figure, the then-US President Donald Trump, announced at a White House Coronavirus Task Force briefing that the FDA would fast-track approval of hydroxychloroquine, a drug used to treat malaria and arthritis, which he said had, “tremendous promise based on the results and other tests”. Despite the Chief Medical Advisor to the President, Dr Anthony Fauci, disputing claims concerning the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine as a potential therapy for coronavirus as “anecdotal evidence”, Trump continued to endorse hydroxychloroquine describing the drug as a “game changer”: HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE & AZITHROMYCIN, taken together, have a real chance to be one of the biggest game changers in the history of medicine. He said that the drugs should be put in use IMMEDIATELY. PEOPLE ARE DYING, MOVE FAST, and GOD BLESS EVERYONE! Trump’s tweet was shared over 102,800 times and liked over 384,800 times. His statements correlated with a 2000% increase in prescriptions for the anti-malarial drugs hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine in the US between 15 and 21 March 2020, resulting in many lupus patients unable to source the drug. There were also reports of overdoses as individuals sought to self-medicate with the drug to treat the virus. Once Trump declared himself a proponent of hydroxychloroquine, scientific inquiry into the drug was eclipsed by an overtly partisan debate. An analysis by Media Matters found that Fox News had promoted the drug 109 times between 23 and 25 March 2020, with other right wing media outlets following suit. The drug was further amplified and politicised by conservative public figures including Trump’s attorney Rudy Giuliani, who claimed on 27 March 2020 that “hydroxychloroquine has been shown to have a 100% effective rate in treating COVID-19”, and Brazil’s President, Jair Bolsonaro, who shared a Facebook post on 8 July 2020 admitting to taking the drug to treat the virus: “I’m one more person for whom this is working. So I trust hydroxychloroquine”. In addition to these conservative political figures endorsing hydroxychloroquine, on 27 July 2020 the right-wing syndicated news outlet Breitbart livestreamed a video depicting America’s Frontline Doctors – a group of physicians backed by the Tea Party Patriots, a conservative political organisation supportive of Trump – at a press conference outside the US Supreme Court in Washington. In the video, Stella Immanuel, a primary care physician in Texas, said “You don’t need masks…There is prevention and there is a cure!”, explaining that Americans could resume their normal lives by preemptively taking hydroxychloroquine. The video was retweeted by public figures including President Trump and Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr., before going viral reaching over 20 million users on Facebook. The video explicitly framed hydroxychloroquine as an effective “cure” for COVID-19 suppressed by “fake doctors”, thereby transferring it from potential treatment to a conspiracy object. These examples not only demonstrate the role of prominent public figures in amplifying conspiratorial claims about hydroxychloroquine as an effective cure for COVID-19, they reveal how these figures converted the drug into an “article of faith” divorced from scientific evidence. Consequently, to believe in its efficacy as a cure for COVID-19 demonstrated support for Trump and ideological skepticism of the scientific and medical establishment. Ivermectin, the “Miracle Cure” Ivermectin followed a different amplification trajectory. The amplifying process was primarily led by influencers in alternative media spaces and those associated with the IDW, many of whom position themselves in contrast to the mainstream media and politics. Despite scientists conducting clinical trials for ivermectin in early 2020, the ivermectin conspiracy peaked much later that year. On 8 December 2020, the pulmonary and ICU specialist Dr. Pierre Kory testified to the US Senate Committee about I-MASK: a prevention and early outpatient treatment protocol for COVID-19. During the hearing, Kory claimed that “ivermectin is effectively a ‘miracle drug’ against COVID-19”, which could end the pandemic. Kory’s depiction of ivermectin as a panacea, and the subsequent media hype, elevated him as a public figure and led to an increase in public demand for ivermectin in early 2021. This resulted in supply issues and led some people to seek formulations of the drug designed for animals, which were in greater supply and easier to access. Several months later in June 2021, Kory’s description of ivermectin as a “miracle cure” was amplified by a series of influencers, including Bret Weinstein and Joe Rogan, both of whom featured Kory on their podcasts as a key public figure in the fight against COVID Conspiratorial associations with ivermectin were further amplified on 9 July 2021 when Bret Weinstein appeared on Fox Nation's Tucker Carlson Today claiming he had “been censored for raising concerns about the shots and the medical establishment's opposition to alternative treatments”. The drug was embroiled in further controversy on 1 September 2021 when Joe Rogan shared an Instagram post explaining that he had taken ivermectin as one of many drugs to treat the virus. In the months that followed, Rogan featured several controversial scientists on his podcast who implied that ivermectin was an effective COVID “cure” suppressed as part of a global agenda to promote vaccine uptake. These public figures included Dr Robert Malone, an American physician who contributed to the development of mRNA technology, and Dr Peter McCullough, an American cardiologist with expertise in vaccines. As McCullough explained to Rogan in December 2021: it seemed to me early on that there was an intentional very comprehensive suppression of early treatment in order to promote fear, suffering, isolation, hospitalisation and death and it seemed to be completely organised and intentional in order to create acceptance for and then promote mass vaccination. McCullough went on to imply that the pandemic was planned and that vaccine manufacturers were engaged in a coordinated response to profit from mass vaccination. Consequently, whereas conservative public figures, such as Trump and Bolsonaro, played a primary role in amplifying the hype around hydroxychloroquine as a COVID cure and embroiling it in a political and conspiratorial narrative of collusion, influencers, especially those associated with alternative media and the IDW, were crucial in amplifying the ivermectin conspiracy online by platforming controversial scientists who espoused the drug as a “miracle cure”, which could allegedly end the pandemic but was being suppressed by the government and medical establishment. Debunking Debunking processes refuting the efficacy of these drugs as COVID “cures” contributed to the amplification of these conspiracies. In April 2020 the paper endorsing hydroxychloroquine that Trump tweeted about a week earlier was debunked. The debunking process for hydroxychloroquine involved a series of statements, papers, randomised clinical trials and retractions not only rejecting the efficacy of hydroxychloroquine, but suggesting it was unsafe and had the potential to cause harm (Boulware et al.; Mehra; Voss). In April 2020, the FDA released a statement cautioning against the use of hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19 outside of a hospital setting or a clinical trial due to risk of heart rhythm problems, and in June the FDA revoked its emergency use authorisation to treat COVID-19 in certain hospitalised patients. The debunking process was not limited to fact-based claims, it also involved satire and ridicule of those endorsing the drug as a treatment for COVID-19. Given the politicisation of the drug, much of this criticism was directed at Trump, as a key proponent of the drug, and Republicans in general, both of whom were cast as scientifically illiterate. The debunking process for ivermectin was similarly initiated by scientific and medical authorities who questioned the efficacy of ivermectin as a COVID-19 treatment due to reliability issues with trials and the quality of evidence (Lawrence). In response to claims that supply issues led people to seek formulations of the drug designed for animals, in April 2021 the FDA released a statement cautioning people not to take ivermectin to prevent or treat COVID-19: While there are approved uses for ivermectin in people and animals, it is not approved for the prevention or treatment of COVID-19 … . People should never take animal drugs … . Using these products in humans could cause serious harm. The CDC echoed this warning, claiming that “veterinary formulations intended for use in large animals such as horses, sheep, and cattle can be highly concentrated and result in overdoses when used by humans”. Many journalists and Internet users involved in debunking ivermectin reduced the drug to horse paste. Social media feeds debunking ivermectin were filled with memes ridiculing those consuming “horse dewormer”. Mockery of those endorsing ivermectin extended beyond social media, with the popular US sketch comedy show Saturday Night Live featuring a skit mocking Joe Rogan for consuming “horse medicine” to treat the virus. The skit circulated on social media in the following days, further deriding advocates of the drug as a COVID cure as not only irresponsible, but stupid. This type of ridicule, visually expressed in videos and Internet memes, fuelled polarisation. This polarisation was then weaponised by influencers associated with the IDW to sell ivermectin as a “miracle drug” suppressed by the medical and political establishment, thereby embroiling the drug further in conspiracy (Baker and Maddox). This type of opportunistic marketing is not intended for a mass audience. Instead, audiences are taking advantage of what Crystal Abidin refers to as “silosociality”, wherein content is tailored for specific subcommunities, which are not necessarily “accessible” or “legible” to outsiders (Abidin Refracted Publics 4). This dynamic both reflects and reinforces the audience segmentation that occurs in the current media ecology by virtue of alternative media with mockery and ridicule strengthening in- and out-group dynamics.   Conclusion In this article we have traced how hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin moved from promising potential COVID-19 treatments to objects tainted by conspiracy. Despite common associations of conspiracy theories with the fringe, both the hydroxychloroquine and ivermectin conspiracy theories emerged in the mainstream, amplified across mainstream social networks with the help of influencers and public figures whose claims were further amplified by the news media commenting on their apparent endorsement of these drugs as COVID cures. Whereas hydroxychloroquine was politicised as a result of controversial public figures and right-wing media outlets endorsing the drug and the conspiratorial narrative espoused by America’s Frontline Doctors, notably much of the conspiracy around ivermectin shifted to alternative media spaces amplified by influencers disillusioned with the mainstream media. We have demonstrated how debunking processes, which sought to discredit these drugs as potential treatments for COVID-19, often ridiculed those who endorsed them, further polarising discussions involving these treatments and pushing advocates to the extreme. By encouraging proponents of these treatments to retreat to alternative media spaces, such as podcasts and newsletters, polarisation strengthened in-group dynamics, assisting the ability for opportunistic influencers to weaponise these conspiracies for social, economic, and political gain. These findings raise important questions about how to effectively counter conspiracies. 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