In:
Journal of Conflict Resolution, SAGE Publications, Vol. 62, No. 8 ( 2018-09), p. 1784-1813
Abstract:
This article analyzes an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international property rights violation. Veto-player-type constraints curtail governments’ ability to engage in outright and (nontransfer related) creeping expropriation but have little impact on their ability to generate wealth via transfer restrictions. We use a formal model to derive testable implications regarding the effect of political institutions and domestic politics on governments’ ability to collect these two types of rent. Empirically, we use novel time-series cross-sectional data to show that while veto-player-type political constraints diminish expropriation risk, transfer risk is much less affected: even constrained governments impose transfer restrictions.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0022-0027
,
1552-8766
DOI:
10.1177/0022002717701181
Language:
English
Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Publication Date:
2018
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1500229-9
detail.hit.zdb_id:
3013-2
SSG:
5,2
SSG:
3,6
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