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  • Articles  (15)
  • Articles: DFG German National Licenses  (15)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games
    Amsterdam : Elsevier
    Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1994), S. 390-405 
    Details
    ISSN: 0899-8256
    Source: Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1058
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Low Discounting and the Upper Long-Run Average Value in Dynamic Programming
    Amsterdam : Elsevier
    Games and Economic Behavior 6 (1994), S. 262-282 
    Details
    ISSN: 0899-8256
    Source: Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1014
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming
    Amsterdam : Elsevier
    Games and Economic Behavior 6 (1994), S. 97-113 
    Details
    ISSN: 0899-8256
    Source: Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1005
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Weak and strong merging of opinions
    Amsterdam : Elsevier
    Journal of Mathematical Economics 23 (1994), S. 73-86 
    Details
    ISSN: 0304-4068
    Keywords: Bayesian learning ; Merging ; [jel] C11 ; [jel] C44 ; [jel] D83
    Source: Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90037-X
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Regular simple games (1989)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 18 (1989), S. 195-207 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Using Kelley's intersection number (and a variant of it) we define two classes of simple games, the regular and the strongly regular games. We show that the strongly regular games are those in which the set of winning coalitions and the set of losing coalitions can be strictly separated by a finitely additive probability measure. This, in particular, provides a combinatorial characterization for the class of finite weighted majority games within the finite simple games. We also prove that regular games have some nice properties and show that the finite regular games are exactly those simple games which are uniquely determined by their counting vector. This, in particular, generalizes a result of Chow and Lapidot.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01268159
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Internal correlation in repeated games (1991)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 19 (1991), S. 431-456 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper characterizes the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs in two player repeated games where the signal that the players get after each stage is either trivial (does not reveal any information) or standard (the signal is the pair of actions played). It turns out that if the information is not always trivial then the set of all the Nash equilibrium payoffs coincides with the set of the correlated equilibrium payoffs. In particular, any correlated equilibrium payoff of the one shot game is also a Nash equilibrium payoff of the repeated game. For the proof we develop a scheme by which two players can generate any correlation device, using the signaling structure of the game. We present strategies with which the players internally correlate their actions without the need of an exogenous mediator.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01766432
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions (1989)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 18 (1989), S. 57-89 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We characterize, by the one-shot game terms, the set of lower equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted repeated game with non-observable actions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01248496
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Global games (1991)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 20 (1991), S. 129-147 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Global games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subsets) of the set of players. They capture “public good” aspects of cooperation, i.e., situations where the payoff is naturally defined for all players (“the globe”) together, as is the case with issues of environmental clean-up, medical research, and so forth. We analyze the more general concept of lattice functions and apply it to partition functions, set functions and the interrelation between the two. We then use this analysis to define and characterize the Shapley value and the core of global games.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01240274
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value (1988)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 17 (1988), S. 89-99 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value is given. It is based on a version of three axioms, which are common to all the semi-values, and on an additional reduction axiom.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01254541
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring (1992)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 20 (1992), S. 211-226 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We show that any payoff, sustainable by a joint strategy of finitely repeated games, from which no player can deviate and gain by a non-detectable deviation, is a uniform equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. This provides a characterization of the uniform equilibrium payoffs in terms of the finitely repeated games.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01253776
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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