In:
Problemos, Vilnius University Press, Vol. 69 ( 2006-01-01), p. 9-26
Abstract:
Trys pagrindinės būsimos mokslo pažangos prognozės yra objektyvistinis finitizmas (pažanga baigsis, nes ribotą gamtą išsems mokslas), subjektyvistinis finitizmas (pažanga baigsis, nes žmogaus pažintinės galios yra ribotos) ir infinitizmas (gamtotyros pažanga niekada nesibaigs). Straipsnyje svarstomi Johno D. Barrowo, Johno Horgano, Nicholas Rescherio darbuose pateikti argumentai už ir prieš šiuos požiūrius. Pagrindinis dėmesys skiriamas atrankinės giminystės ryšiams tarp mokslo ateities prognozių ir pagrindinių epistemologinių srovių. Realistinė pažinimo, kaip tikrovės atvaizdo ar žemėlapio, samprata yra artimesnė finitizmui, palyginti su idealistine pažinimo, kaip problemų sprendimų proceso, turinčio „hermeneutinio rato“ pavidalą, samprata. Tuo pat metu idealizmu lengva pagrįsti reliatyvizmą, kuris neigia skirtingų mokslo raidos fazių bendramatiškumą (palyginamumą), kartu nepripažįsta ir mokslo pažangos, o realizmas ją logiškai implikuoja. Stipriausiu argumentu infinitizmo naudai laikomas pragmatinis: tikėjimas mokslo pažangos ribomis gali tapti save patvirtinančia prognoze, todėl infinitizmas yra mokslo „vidinė ideologija“ arba jį pamatuojantis metanaratyvas. Reikšminiai žodžiai: mokslo pažanga, mokslinio pažinimo ribos, idealizmas ir realizmas epistemologijoje. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE FORECASTS OF THE NATURAL SCIENTIFIC PROGRESSZenonas Norkus Summary Three main forecasts of the future of scientific progress are (1) objectivistic limitism (the progress will end because the finite nature will be exhausted by science), (2) subjectivistic limitism (the progress will end because human cognitive capacities are limited), and (3) infinitism (the progress will go infinitely). The paper makes a contribution to the ongoing discussion (its participants include John D. Barrow, John Horgan, Nicholas Rescher, among others) by providing an analysis of the relations of elective affinity between forecasts of the future of science and main epistemological standpoints. The realist view of cognition as production of a picture or map of reality is considered as more closely related to finitism than the idealist view of cognition as the problem-solving process displaying the “hermeneutical circle” structure and involving the radical conceptual revolutions. There are, however, important differences among different versions of realism, with a very close relation between “scientific realism” and finitism. At the same time, the idealistic view is more prone to relativism that asserts the incommensurability among different phases of the scientific change and denies the very fact of scientific progress, while for realism scientific progress is a logical implication. The strongest argument for infinitism is pragmatic one: if scientists will believe that finitism is true, the progress can come to an end as a matter of self-fulfilling prediction. Therefore, infinitism is the best “internal ideology” of science or its metanarrative. The scope of the article is limited to the discussion of the problem of scientific progress in natural sciences.Keywords: scientific progress, limits of science, epistemological idealism and realism.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
2424-6158
,
1392-1126
DOI:
10.15388/Problemos.2006..4060
Language:
Unknown
Publisher:
Vilnius University Press
Publication Date:
2006
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2270607-0
SSG:
5,1
SSG:
7,44
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