In:
Canadian Journal of History, University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress), Vol. 34, No. 1 ( 1999-04), p. 1-22
Abstract:
Between 1584 and 1589, during the last of France's endemic civil-religious wars, the Huguenot struggle for survival under Henri de Navarre involved two interdependent campaigns against the joint strength of the Valois Crown and the Guise-led Catholic League. One was military. Partly because they lacked sufficient resources for offensive action, the Calvinists waged a defensive war to blunt the enemy attack and buy time until they could seize the military initiative. They played, in short, a tactical game of "cat and mouse," led by Navarre, as they evaded the claws of their more powerful adversaries. But this defensive posture was compelled partly also by a second, political campaign of cat and mouse, also directed by Navarre, to separate Henri III from the over-mighty Guise faction, and then join him against that common enemy. What the Huguenot chef de parti recognized was that ultimate Calvinist success depended upon a broader strategy that combined the military and political elements of the conflict, in order to define the appropriate rules of engagement. Although, in the short term, this forced the Huguenots onto the defensive, limiting their prospects for battlefield victories; in the long term it gained them the political advantage — and thus the military advantage, too — when Navarre finally secured the long-hoped-for alliance with Henri III in April 1589 against the League.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0008-4107
,
2292-8502
Language:
English
Publisher:
University of Toronto Press Inc. (UTPress)
Publication Date:
1999
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2031582-X
SSG:
7,26
SSG:
8
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