In:
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, SAGE Publications, Vol. 21, No. 10 ( 1995-10), p. 1083-1092
Abstract:
A well-substantiated, surprising finding is that people judge the occurrence of an event of low probability as less likely when its probability is represented by a ratio of smaller (e.g., I in 20) than of larger (e.g., 10 in 200) numbers. The results of three experiments demonstrated that the phenomenon is broadly general and occurs as readily in pre-as in post outcome judgments. These results support an interpretation in terms of subjective probability, as suggested by the principles of cognitive-experiential self theory, but not an interpretation in terms of imagining counter-factual alternatives, as proposed by norm theory.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0146-1672
,
1552-7433
DOI:
10.1177/01461672952110009
Language:
English
Publisher:
SAGE Publications
Publication Date:
1995
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2047603-6
SSG:
5,2
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