In:
Philosophers' Imprint, University of Michigan Library, Vol. 22, No. 0 ( 2022-11-28)
Abstract:
Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers influence perception in two ways. First, they allow for a form of perception that is contemplative—that is, a form of perception that aims to work out how and what things are, and not just how things are to be responded to. Second, they afford us practical and theoretical forms of understanding that inform what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1533-628X
DOI:
10.3998/phimp.issue.86
Language:
Unknown
Publisher:
University of Michigan Library
Publication Date:
2022
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2130563-8
SSG:
5,1
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